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This manuscript examines the effect of a novel experience on subsequent choice and 
preferences.  
Chapter 1 reviews neuroimaging and behavioral evidence suggesting that novelty 
activates dopaminergic brain areas involved in reward processing and serves as a 
reward-predicting cue, enhancing responses to the rewarding aspects of stimuli and 
motivating exploration in search of potentially valuable outcomes. Based on this 
evidence, it is proposed that people will be more likely to explore, following a novel 
experience, and that in a consumer context this exploratory tendency will result in 
choice of a broader and more varied set of options from an assortment of products.  
Results from three experiments support these hypotheses. Study 1 showed that 
participants who had seen novel (vs. familiarized) images chose a greater diversity of 
snacks in a subsequent task and rated those snacks as more appealing. Study 2 
conceptually replicated these effects in the context of a series of choices and also 
showed, consistently with theory and predictions, that the effect of novelty on 
subsequent variety seeking is observed only when the choice options are potentially 
rewarding. Study 3 demonstrated that exposure to novelty improves evaluations and 
promotes exploration among less typical, but still enjoyable, members of a product 
category, suggesting that novelty may promote other forms of consumer exploratory 
behavior such as innovativeness.  
 
 Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the neuroscience literature on reward 
processing. It outlines the various components of reward processing, such as pleasure, 
learning, and motivation, and provides a critical analysis of the existing hypotheses 
about the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine in these processes and the existence of 
dedicated reward-processing networks in the brain. 
Chapter 3 provides a critical overview of ERP and fMRI evidence for the influence of 
positive affect on various cognitive processes, such as memory, cognitive flexibility, 
and creative problem solving, and the mediating role of dopamine in these processes. 
The neuroimaging data is interpreted in the context of findings from behavioral 
studies; consistencies and discrepancies between the neuroimaging and the behavioral 
data are discussed.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE EFFECT OF NOVELTY ON SUBSEQUENT CHOICE AND PREFERENCES 
 
Consumers‟ product search and decision making often begin with exposure to 
something novel. For example, the first section that consumers encounter in a clothing 
store is typically “new arrivals.” Similarly, online stores often have information about 
new products prominently displayed on the home page. And a visit to the grocery 
store may involve sampling new products or encountering a novel display or décor. 
Novel items provoke attention, curiosity, and exploration, and these effects have been 
well documented in the cognitive and social psychology literatures, as well as the 
marketing literature (Berlyne 1960; Fiske and Maddi 1961; Venkatesan 1973). 
The downstream effects of a novel experience on preferences and choice, 
however, have received little attention. How does a novel experience affect 
consumers‟ tendency to explore among subsequent product options? Do they consider 
a broader, or a narrower, range of options after having browsed through the store‟s 
novel items first? Does the novel design of an online store‟s home page, or a 
traditional store‟s décor, influence the range of products consumers purchase, and their 
liking for these products? We propose that experiencing novelty will lead consumers 
to explore more in a subsequent situation, and that this exploratory tendency will 
result in choice of a more varied set of options from an assortment of products.  
 
Theoretical Background 
 
Novelty: Definitions and Types 
 Researchers have distinguished among several types of novelty. One 
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distinction is based on temporal considerations: an item can be novel with respect to 
an individual‟s recent experience (short-term novelty), more distant experience (long-
term novelty), or total experience (complete novelty) (Berlyne 1960; Daffner et al. 
2000a).  A distinction has also been made between “absolute novelty,” when a 
stimulus has a quality that has never been perceived before, and “relative novelty,” 
when a stimulus possesses familiar qualities but in a novel combination or 
arrangement (Berlyne 1960), or “associative novelty,” when a familiar stimulus is 
presented in a novel configuration with other stimuli (Lisman and Grace 2005; Schott 
et al. 2004). Lisman and Grace (2005) have also identified a form of novelty related to 
events or stimuli that are unexpected under a given cue condition. This is similar to the 
operationalization of novelty in event-related potential (ERP) studies, where, in an 
odd-ball paradigm, a novel event is a low-frequency deviant or unexpected stimulus 
appearing within a train of homogeneous “standard” stimuli (e.g., Friedman et al. 
2001). Bunzek and Duzel (2006), however, present fMRI evidence that contextual 
deviance of this kind does not produce the same brain activity or the same cognitive 
effects as “pure novelty” (i.e., never-seen-before stimuli). Their view is closer to that 
of Berlyne (1960), who classifies “surprisingness” together with other stimulus 
properties such as change, complexity, and incongruity that often accompany novelty, 
but do not constitute novelty per se.  
At this point, there seems to be no agreement as to how exactly the construct of 
“novelty” should be defined, and whether the different types of novelty identified in 
the literature are processed in a different manner by the brain and produce distinct 
cognitive and behavioral effects. Combining imaging techniques, such as ERP and 
fMRI, with more traditional cognitive and behavioral measures, may shed more light 
on these issues in the future. 
In any case, it is likely that most instances of novelty in one‟s everyday life 
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will be of the “short-term,” “long-term”, or “relative,” rather than the “absolute” or 
“complete” type of novelty, since, as Berlyne (1960) pointed out, however novel a 
stimulus maybe, it must be “similar to and relatable to a host of familiar and 
frequently experienced entities” and “must consist of lines, angles, and curves such as 
have been seen earlier” (Berlyne 1960, p. 25). The extent to which a stimulus is 
considered novel, then, will likely depend on the individual‟s subjective past 
experience, as well as on the particular context in which that stimulus is encountered.  
The subjective novelty of a stimulus or configuration has been found to decline 
progressively with repetition of that stimulus or configuration (e.g., Berlyne and 
Parham 1968; Daffner et al. 1998), and to increase with the number of repetitions of a 
stimulus or configuration presented prior to the target one, as well as with the number 
of properties along which the target stimulus differs from the preceding ones (Berlyne 
and Parham 1968). Novelty, in its various forms, has also been found to possess 
certain properties that are of particular relevance to the present research, and are 
reviewed in the following section.  
 
Properties of Novelty 
Novelty, attention, and exploration. Psychologists have long shown that 
novelty attracts attention and promotes exploratory responses (Berlyne 1960; Chong et 
al. 2008; Daffner et al. 1998; 2000a; Fiske and Maddi 1961; Mesulam 1998). Berlyne 
(1960) described a series of experiments showing that people attend preferentially to 
novel, vs. familiar, stimuli. For example, when a white and a red circle appeared 
simultaneously in an aperture, a significantly greater percentage of participants 
responded to the white circle after having viewed a series of red circles earlier, and to 
the red circle after having viewed a series of white circles. In another experiment, 
pairs of images were projected on a screen, for 10 seconds each, the same image 
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appearing repeatedly on one side, and a different image appearing every time on the 
other side. Participants spent a growing proportion of the 10 seconds fixating the novel 
slide. Infants have been shown to maintain their gaze for a longer time at novel stimuli 
when presented within a pair of novel and already viewed stimuli (Fagan 1990), and to 
be more likely to play with novel than with familiar toys (Fiske and Maddi 1961). 
Similar results, using viewing time as a measure of attention and exploration, have 
been reported in a number of more recent studies as well (e.g., Chong et al. 2008; 
Daffner et al. 1998; 2000a). Marketing researchers have also noted the importance of 
novelty, in the form of new products, new ads, etc., in capturing the attention of 
consumers (Faison 1977; Hirschman 1980; Howard and Sheth 1969; Raju 1980; 
Venkatesan 1973). Hirschman (1980), for example, pointed out that it is the 
propensity of consumers to adopt new products such as new ideas, goods, or services, 
“that gives the marketplace its dynamic nature,” and without which “consumer 
behavior would consist of a series of routinized buying responses to a static set of 
products” (Hirschman 1980, p. 283).  
At the physiological level, the link between novelty, attention, and exploration 
is supported by ERP studies of the “orienting response” to novel stimuli. The most 
commonly studied ERP responses to novelty are the N2 and the P3. The N2 is a 
negative deflection in the brain‟s electrical field that is evoked in the 180-325 ms 
temporal window. It is sensitive to deviations from long-term context that render a 
stimulus unfamiliar and difficult to encode (i.e., strange and unusual visual patterns). 
The P3 is a positive deflection that peaks at about 300 ms after stimulus onset and is 
evoked in all three primary sensory modalities in response to infrequent, novel stimuli 
that deviate from the immediate context (Daffner et al. 2000b). In addition to 
reflecting the processing of different aspects of novelty (i.e. novelty with respect to 
long-term context vs. novelty with respect to immediate or local context), the N2 and 
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the P3 also are believed to differ in the level of cognitive resources involved. While 
the N2 is considered to be preattentive, relatively automatic and involuntary, the P3 is 
believed to mark the preferential allocation of attentional resources to potentially 
significant events and to be modulated by a variety of factors such as task relevance 
and subjective motivation (Chong et al. 2008). This is supported by observed strong 
correlation between the amplitude of the P3 response to a stimulus and the duration of 
viewing of that stimulus (Daffner et al. 1998). The P3, furthermore, involves two 
subcomponents: an earlier anterior P3a and a later posterior P3b. It is believed that the 
P3a indexes decisions about the extent to which novel or deviant stimuli or events are 
potentially significant and merit the allocation of additional processing resources, 
while the P3b indexes the process of updating representations in working memory and 
categorizing the novel stimulus (Chong et al. 2008). Both N2 and P3 diminish in 
amplitude with repeated exposure to the novel stimulus (Daffner et al. 1998), 
reflecting the process of habituation.  
Novelty and learning. Besides facilitating attention, novelty is also believed to 
represent a potent encoding signal. According to Tulving‟s “novelty/encoding 
hypothesis” (Tulving et al. 1996), for example, the probability of long-term encoding 
of information is directly related to the degree of its novelty. Tulving postulated the 
existence of a dedicated novelty assessment network in the brain that identifies 
adaptively significant novel events and stimuli and transmits the relevant information 
for further processing.  
 The components of this network are now relatively well understood. It is 
believed that novelty is first assessed in the hippocampus, where incoming 
information is compared with stored memories (Lisman and Grace 2005; Grace et al. 
2007). The novelty signal is then carried from the hippocampus to the Ventral 
Tegmental Area (VTA) along a polysynaptic pathway through the nucleus accumbens 
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(NAc) and the ventral pallidum. A population of dopamine (DA) neurons in the VTA 
is held at a constant hyperpolarized, inactive state by the ventral pallidum. Inactivation 
of the ventral pallidum by the NAc releases the VTA DA neurons from inhibition and 
allows them to enter a state of spontaneous “tonic” firing activity. The transition from 
this “tonic” state to a burst-firing “phasic” dopamine response depends on input from 
the pedunculopontene tegmentum (PPTg) – a structure that receives various sensory 
inputs, as well as inputs from the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and limbic structures such as 
the amygdala (Grace et al. 2007). Thus the novelty signal from the hippocampus is 
modulated by goal-related, affective, and sensory information (Grace et al. 2007; 
Lisman and Grace 2005), and this modulation determines the phasic firing of the DA 
neurons in the VTA. The VTA then sends ascending projections back to the 
hippocampus, among other structures, completing the hippocampal – VTA loop and 
allowing the novel information to enter long-term memory. It is now well established 
that the dopamine released into the hippocampus by the firing VTA DA neurons, 
following exposure to novelty, enhances long-term potentiation and promotes learning 
(Grace et al. 2007; Li et al. 2003; Lisman and Grace 2005).   
Novelty and reward. It has been suggested that the preferential attention, 
exploration, and encoding of novel stimuli may be part of an adaptive mechanism 
facilitating the learning of new sources of reward (Kakade and Dayan 2002; Krebs et 
al. 2009; Wittmann et al. 2008). Some researchers, in fact, hold the view that novelty 
may have intrinsically rewarding properties, as suggested by findings in the animal 
literature showing that novelty can reinforce and maintain behavior and produce 
preferences for places associated with it (Bevins et al. 2002; Butler 1953). Monkeys, 
for example, successfully learned an object discrimination task in a setting where the 
only reward was visual exploration (Butler 1953) and rats developed conditioned 
preferences for places associated with access to novel objects (Bevins et al. 2002).  
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The view that novelty is rewarding is also supported by findings that, in both 
animals and humans, exposure to novel stimuli is associated with activity in reward-
processing dopaminergic areas such as the substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area 
(SN/VTA) and NAc (Bunzeck and Duzel 2006; Fenker et al. 2008; Krebs et al. 2009; 
Wittmann et al. 2008). Specifically, midbrain dopaminergic neurons that respond 
preferentially to rewards and reward-predicting cues, also get activated by affectively 
neutral novel stimuli (Bunzeck and Duzel 2006; Ljungberg, Apicela, and Schultz 
1992; Schultz 1998) and by associative novelty (Schott et al. 2004). Furthermore, in a 
paradigm modeled under classical conditioning procedures, a familiar cue predicting 
subsequent novelty itself activates midbrain dopamine neurons, similarly to the way in 
which these neurons get activated by reward-predicting cues (Wittmann et al. 2007). 
The view that novelty may be intrinsically rewarding runs counter to the “mere 
exposure” effect, suggested by Zajonc (1968), which argues that liking increases with 
familiarity. In his seminal paper, Zajonc (1968) showed that people rated various 
stimuli, such as “Turkish” words, Chinese characters, and photographs of men, more 
positively after repeated exposure. This effect was subsequently replicated over a wide 
range of stimuli including music, paintings, drawings, photographs, words, 
ideographs, as well as real people and objects (for a review, see Bornstein 1989).  
The conflicting findings regarding the affective value of novelty can be 
partially reconciled, when certain moderating factors are taken into account. 
Specifically, according to the two-factor model by Berlyne (1970), exposure effects 
are driven by two parallel processes – habituation and tedium, and are moderated by 
the nature of the exposure sequence (e.g., homogeneous vs. heterogeneous) and the 
complexity of the target stimuli. Monotonous and homogeneous sequences are more 
conducive than varied sequences to a decline in affective value after familiarization. 
Furthermore, the perceived value of complex stimuli tends to increase with repetition, 
 8 
due to the prevalence of the habituation factor, but the value of simple stimuli 
decreases, due to the prevalence of tedium. Berlyne‟s two-factor model has been 
supported by a number of studies across a range of stimuli (for a summary see 
Bornstein 1989), including advertising messages and consumer products (Anand and 
Sternthal 1990; Cox and Cox 1988; Mukherjee and Hoyer 2001).  
Recent findings reported in the cognitive neuroscience literature suggest that 
responses to novelty may also depend on the relevant context. There is evidence that 
in contexts that hold the potential for reward, novelty serves as a reward-predicting 
cue that enhances the salience of rewards and motivates the organism to explore in 
search of valuable outcomes (Krebs et al. 2009; Wittmann et al. 2008). In a study by 
Wittmann et al. (2008), for example, participants engaged in an appetitive 
reinforcement learning task involving choice from options associated with specific 
reward probabilities. The choice options on each trial were represented by four 
simultaneously presented images and each image was associated with a constant 
probability of earning money. Participants learned an option‟s reward probability by 
repeatedly sampling it, over a course of 20 choice trials. Importantly, participants were 
familiarized with half of the images (though not with their associated reward 
probability) prior to the choice task, and the other half of the images were new. The 
novelty of the images was manipulated independent of their reward probability. 
Results showed that in the initial stages of the learning task, participants were 
significantly more likely to choose novel images over familiar ones i.e., participants 
behaved as if the expected monetary value of novel images was significantly higher 
than the expected value of familiarized ones.  
In a similar experimental paradigm, Krebs et al. (2009) showed that choice of 
new (vs. familiarized) images that predicted subsequent reward was associated with 
significantly stronger activity in reward-processing dopaminergic areas such as the 
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SN/VTA and the NAc. This pattern of results is consistent with computational choice 
models in which the value of exploration is represented by assigning fictitious “bonus” 
reward value to novel choice options (Kakade and Dayan 2002).  
Importantly, there is initial evidence that novelty enhances reward expectations 
not only with regard to the novel items themselves, but also with regard to items 
encountered in a subsequent situation (Guitart-Masip et al. 2010). In an fMRI study, 
participants were first presented with either novel or with previously seen 
(familiarized) images of indoor or outdoor scenes. Afterwards, they engaged in an 
unrelated task in which a different set of images (abstract patterns) served as cues 
predicting the receipt of monetary reward, under different probabilities. The fMRI data 
revealed that, relative to participants who had viewed familiarized indoor/outdoor 
images, participants who had viewed novel indoor/outdoor images exhibited higher 
activity in reward-related brain areas (i.e., the striatum) during the subsequent reward 
task. The authors concluded that novelty enhances reward responses even when 
novelty and reward constitute unrelated, independent events (Guitart-Masip et al. 
2010). These findings are consistent with the physiological model by Lisman and 
Grace (2005), described earlier, in which novelty exposure boosts subsequent phasic 
dopaminergic responses to rewards by inducing tonic activity in previously inactive 
VTA dopamine neurons. The results are also consistent with temporally-extended 
contextual effects of novelty exposure reported in the literature on memory and 
learning (Bunzek and Düzel 2006; Davis, Jones, and Derrick 2004; Fenker et al. 
2008), where exposure to novelty has been found to promote the encoding of 
unrelated, subsequently encountered stimuli.   
In summary, the literature on novelty suggests that novelty promotes attention, 
exploration, and learning, and that these effects are at least in part driven by a 
mechanism in which novelty serves as a reward-predicting cue motivating exploration 
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in search of potentially valuable outcomes. Importantly, there is initial evidence that 
novelty may also have important contextual effects, such as enhancing reward-
predicting responses to subsequently encountered stimuli (Guitart-Masip et al. 2001).  
 
Research Hypotheses 
Based on the above reviewed properties of novelty, we propose that the ability 
of novelty to promote exploration in search of potentially rewarding outcomes extends 
beyond the novel items, to subsequently encountered unrelated items. Specifically, we 
propose that people will be more likely to explore after experiencing something novel, 
as long as the novelty is not perceived as negative. We test this proposition in a 
consumer context.  
In a consumer context, the tendency to explore may be reflected by curiosity-
motivated information seeking (e.g., information search about products or services), 
variety seeking (e.g., a tendency to seek diversity in product choice), or innovativeness 
(e.g., trial or adoption of new products) (Raju 1980; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 
1992). The current paper investigates of the effect of novelty on consumer variety 
seeking and begins investigation of its effect on innovativeness. 
Variety-seeking has been a central area of research in marketing (for a review, 
see McAlister and Pessemier 1982). Variety-seeking can arise both over time, when 
consumers choose different options on successive occasions (e.g., Givon 1984; Kahn, 
Kalwani, and Morrison 1986), and when they choose a portfolio of options on a single 
occasion (e.g., Simonson 1990). Two major types of drivers of variety-seeking 
behavior have been identified: external drivers, such as sales, promotions, or out-of-
stock conditions, and internal drivers such as consumers‟ desire for variety, 
stimulation, or novelty (for a review, see Kahn 1995; McAlister and Pessemier 1982).  
A number of variables moderating consumers‟ desire for variety have been 
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investigated, from personality characteristics, such as one‟s optimum level of 
stimulation (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 1996; Raju 1980; Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1992), to contextual factors such as the consumption setting (e.g., public 
vs. private; Ariely and Levav 2000), the timing of choice and consumption (e.g., 
simultaneous vs. sequential; Simonson 1990), the variety provided by the context 
(Menon and Kahn 1995), and the affective state of the consumer (Kahn and Isen 
1993).  
We propose that consumers‟ propensity to seek variety will also be moderated 
by prior exposure to novelty. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that encountering 
novelty will promote diversity in subsequent product choice. 
Research on innovativeness, at the individual consumer level, has focused 
mostly on the influence of demographic variables and personality characteristics on 
consumers‟ propensity to try or adopt new products (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 
1996; Herzenstein, Posavac, and Brakus 2007; Raju 1980; Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1992; Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). The influence of moderators such 
as prior knowledge (Moreau, Lehmann, and Markman 2001), temporal distance 
(Castano et al. 2008), and positive affect (Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Kahn 
and Isen 1993) has also been investigated. 
We propose that consumers‟ propensity to innovate will also be affected by 
prior exposure to novelty. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that encountering 
novelty will promote willingness to try new or unusual options in subsequent product 
choice.  
In summary, we propose that encountering novelty in one situation will 
promote subsequent exploration, and that in a consumer context this exploratory 
tendency will be reflected in greater diversity in product choice, as well as in higher 
likelihood of trying new or unusual product options.  
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Study 1 
 
Method 
Thirty-nine university students participated in this study, with eighteen of them 
randomly assigned to a novelty condition, and the rest to a control condition.  
Novelty manipulation. Novelty in this study was operationalized as the 
appearance of novel stimuli at the end of a series of repeating, familiarized stimuli in a 
product-ranking task. Specifically, participants viewed a series of twelve sets of 
product images on the computer and ranked the four images in each set for personal 
preference. In the control condition, the images in all twelve sets were of Tide laundry 
detergent. There were eight different types (e.g., Tide with Dawny, Tide with Febreze, 
etc.), and each type was repeated six times over the course of the twelve trials. In the 
novelty condition, the images in the first eleven sets were the same as those in the 
control condition, but the images in the last set were new and were also from a 
different product category (Crest tooth paste). This operationalization of novelty is 
similar to that in Berlyne‟s studies (Berlyne 1970), where an item is judged to be more 
novel when it appears at the end of a sequence of repeating items and differs from 
those preceding items along several dimensions.  
All images were pretested for valence and arousal with a group of 62 students 
recruited from the same pool as participants in the main study. Participants in the 
pretest indicated how each of the images made them feel on seven-point scales 
measuring valence (bad/good, unpleasant/pleasant, negative/positive; valence index, α 
= .98) and arousal (peaceful/nervous, relaxed/tense, r = .93). Repeated-measures 
ANOVAs indicated that the Tide detergent images did not differ, on average, from the 
Crest toothpaste images in valence (M = 5.42 vs. 5.39; F(1, 61) < 1, NS) or arousal (M 
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= 2.88 vs. 2.73; F(1, 61) < 1, NS). 
Procedure. Participants were run one at a time. Each performed two tasks, the 
product ranking task, which was also the novelty manipulation, and then a snack 
choice task which took place in a separate room. Participants were told that the 
management of a cafeteria wanted to know what kinds of snacks were popular among 
students. Every participant received $3.00 which could be used to purchase items from 
a set of twelve snacks (Coke, Tropicana orange juice, Snyder’s pretzels, Doritos 
tortilla chips, Snickers candy bar, M&Ms chocolate candies, Nature Valley granola 
bar, Welch’s dried fruit, Milky Way candy bar, Kit-Kat candy bar, Almond Joy candy 
bar, and Minute Maid raisins). All snacks were displayed on a table, with the price 
clearly indicated.  Prices of the different items ranged from $0.50 to $1.50. 
Participants could purchase any combination of snacks within their $3.00 budget, 
including multiples of the same snack, or no snacks at all. The number of different 
snacks participants purchased served as a measure of variety seeking in this context 
(Simonson 1990). Participants also indicated how much they liked the snacks, how 
attractive, and how tempting the snacks were, on seven-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = 
extremely).  
 
Results and Discussion 
A one-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the novelty and control 
conditions did not differ significantly in the average total number of snacks purchased 
(Mnovelty = 3.11 vs. Mcontrol = 2.24; F(1, 37) = 2.43, p = 1.13). However, a one-way 
ANOVA on the number of different snacks purchased revealed that novelty 
participants chose a significantly more varied snack portfolio than did controls (Mnovelty 
= 3.00 vs. Mcontrol = 1.76, F(1, 37) = 7.45, p = .01). While controls tended to purchase 
more of the same snack (e.g., four cans of Coke), novelty participants purchased a 
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more diverse set of snacks. We created a “snack appeal” index (α = .85), combining 
the three questions regarding the attractiveness of the snacks. A one-way ANOVA on 
this index revealed that novelty participants perceived the set of snacks as significantly 
more attractive (M = 5.07) than did controls (M = 3.97; F(1, 37) = 6.82, p = .01).  
To test whether the enhanced appeal of the snacks mediated the effect of 
novelty on the diversity of the snacks chosen, a mediation analysis was performed 
following the Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure. The first criterion for mediation 
was satisfied because, when the snack appeal index was regressed on novelty, the 
coefficient for novelty was significant (β = 1.11, t = 2.61, p = .01). The second 
criterion was also satisfied because, when the diversity measure was regressed on the 
snack appeal index, the coefficient for the index was also significant (β = .67, t = 4.78, 
p < .0001). The third and final criterion was supported because the effect of novelty on 
diversity, which was significant when diversity was regressed on novelty alone (β = 
1.24, t = 2.73, p = .01), became non-significant when the snack appeal index was 
included in the model (β = .59, t = 1.41, p > .10), but the coefficient for the snack 
appeal index remained significant (β = .58, t = 3.89, p < .0001). The drop in 
significance level for the effect of novelty on diversity was significant (Sobel z = 2.31, 
p = .02). Thus the increased appeal of the snacks resulting from novelty mediated 
novelty‟s effect on the preference for diversity.  
This study provided initial support for our hypothesis that novelty promotes 
subsequent exploration manifested as preference for diversity. Participants who 
viewed a series of images containing novelty selected more different options in a 
subsequent choice task. They also rated the choice options as more appealing, and this 
enhanced appeal mediated the influence of novelty on preference for diversity. The 
data is also consistent with the view that novelty promotes exploration by enhancing 
the salience of the potentially rewarding properties of options.  
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One could argue, however, that novelty in our manipulation was confounded 
with variety since the set of product images in the novelty condition was also more 
varied than that in the control condition. This higher variety, not novelty, may have 
prompted participants to choose more varied items later on, which would be consistent 
with the findings by Maimaran and Wheeler (2008) who show that exposure to arrays 
of geometric figures characterized by variety primes variety seeking in a subsequent 
unrelated choice task. To rule out priming as an alternative explanation, we used a 
different manipulation of novelty in our next studies. We also tested a boundary 
condition for the predicted effect: we reasoned that if the effect of novelty on choice 
diversity was the result of an enhanced expectation of rewards, it should be observed 
only when the options available for choice were attractive (i.e., when there was a 
possibility for reward). If the effect, however, is due to priming, it should be observed 
regardless of the attractiveness of the choice options.  
 
Study 2 
 
Study 2 was designed to replicate conceptually the effect of novelty on 
preference for diversity observed in study 1, using a different manipulation of novelty. 
It also included another measure, typically used in the variety-seeking literature, 
namely switching among choice options over time, in order to see whether the effect 
of novelty is specifically on diversity, or if it applies to variety-seeking more broadly, 
as it has been studied in the literature (Givon 1984; Kahn, Kalwani, and Morrison 
1986; McAlister and Pessemier 1982). Study 2 also tested whether the effect of 
novelty on variety seeking is moderated by the attractiveness of the options available 
for choice. For this purpose, we created two sets of choice options – a more appealing 
one, and a less appealing one. We predicted that novelty would promote variety 
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seeking when participants chose from the more appealing set of options, but not when 
they chose from the less appealing set.  
 
Method 
One hundred university students participated in this study, which used a 2 
(novelty: novelty vs. control) x 2 (choice set: more appealing vs. less appealing) 
between-subjects design.  
Novelty manipulation. Novelty in this study was manipulated using a word 
task. Participants were asked, at the beginning of the session, to write down the first 
associate that came to mind in response to each of nine words, pretested to be different 
in familiarity, but equivalent in valence (neutral) and arousal. In the control condition, 
participants provided associates to nine common, neutrally-valenced words (e.g., 
building, paper, etc.), and in the novelty condition to nine less familiar, neutrally-
valenced words (e.g., marmot, dais, etc.).  
In a pretest conducted with 58 students from the same population as those in 
the main study, the novelty and control words were selected from an initial set of 75 
words. Pretest participants rated the familiarity of each word using two seven-point 
semantic differential scales (unfamiliar-familiar, unusual-common; r = .91). 
Participants also indicated how each of the words made them feel on four seven-point 
valence scales (sad-happy, unpleasant-pleasant, negative-positive, bad-good; valence 
index, α = .99) and three seven-point arousal scales (peaceful-nervous, relaxed-tense, 
calm-afraid; arousal index, α = .97). Based on the pretest results, eighteen words (nine 
control and nine novelty words) were selected for use in the word-associates task that 
was to constitute the novelty manipulation. The novelty words were rated as 
significantly less familiar (Mnovelty = 2.14 vs. Mcontrol = 5.11; F(1, 56) = 67.59, p < 
.001), but not significantly different in terms of valence (Mnovelty = 3.09 vs. Mcontrol = 
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3.11; F(1, 56) = .08, NS) or arousal (Mnovelty = 3.02 vs. Mcontrol = 2.97; F(1, 56) = .48, 
NS).  
Choice-set manipulation. Two different snack choice sets were created: a more 
appealing one (Lay’s potato chips, Cheetos cheese snacks, Doritos tortilla chips, Chex 
Mix party mix, RoldGold pretzels, and Smartfood popcorn) and a less appealing one, 
containing two of the snacks from the appealing set (RoldGold pretzels, and Smartfood 
popcorn) and four “negative” snacks (Lay’s fried pork rinds, Ruffle’s dill pickle chips, 
Genisoy’s low-salt soy sticks, Lowry’s deep fried bacon curls), based on a pretest with 
107 participants from the same population as those in the study. Participants in the 
pretest rated the taste of each snack on a 7-point scale (1 = very bad taste, 7 = very 
good taste). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that the snacks in the less 
appealing set were perceived as significantly worse tasting (M = 3.14), on average, 
than the snacks in the more appealing set, (M = 5.16; F(1, 115) = 144.03, p < .001).  
Procedure. First, participants performed the word-associates task, which 
constituted the novelty manipulation, but was described as a pretest of materials to be 
used in future studies. The associates provided by the participants in response to these 
words would later be evaluated for unusualness and for valence by independent 
judges, to constitute an implicit manipulation check. Then participants were given a 
choice task, which involved the dependent measures for the study. Participants were 
asked to assume that they would be on campus the following ten days and that each 
day they would purchase one snack from a vending machine. The snacks available on 
each day were listed on the computer screen. Half of the participants chose from the 
more appealing choice set, and the other half from the less appealing set. The main 
dependent variable was variety seeking assessed as the number of different snacks 
(diversity) participants included in their choice portfolio and the number of times they 
switched from one snack to another (switching). Participants also indicated, on three 
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7-point scales, how much they found the snacks to be attractive, appealing, and liked 
(1 = not at all, 7 = a lot; snack appeal index, α = .86).  
 
Results 
Manipulation check. To assess the effectiveness of the novelty manipulation, 
we analyzed the unusualness of the associates that participants gave in the word task, 
because prior research has shown that novel, relative to familiar, words elicit more 
diverse and unusual associations (Cramer 1968). To assess unusualness, we calculated, 
for every participant, the mean number of other respondents who gave the same 
associate, averaging over the ten words. A one-way ANOVA revealed that this mean 
was significantly lower in the novelty condition than in the control condition, i.e., 
fewer identical responses were generated in the novelty condition than in the control 
condition (Mnovelty = 6.06 vs. Mcontrol = 11.37; F(1, 98) = 60.47, p < .001).  
To verify that the novelty words did not differ, on average, from the control 
words in terms of valence, two judges, blind to the study hypotheses and the subject‟s 
experimental condition, rated the associates given by the participants in response to 
the stimulus words in terms of positivity and negativity. The ratings by the two judges 
were significantly correlated (r = .85) and found no difference between the novelty 
and control conditions in the valence of their associates (Mcontrol = .06 vs. Mnovelty = 
.02; F(1, 98) <1, NS).  
Variety-seeking. A 2 (novelty: novelty vs. control) x 2 (choice set: more 
appealing vs. less appealing) ANOVA on the number of different snacks participants 
chose over the ten trials revealed a main effect of choice set, F(1, 96) = 15.11; p < 
.001. Participants chose more different items from the more appealing set (Mmore 
appealing = 4.13 vs. Mless appealing = 3.30). This main effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction between novelty and choice set (F(1, 96) = 4.52, p < .05). Planned 
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contrasts revealed that novelty participants selected a significantly higher number of 
different snacks when choosing from the more appealing set (Mnovelty = 4.56 vs. Mcontrol 
= 3.75; F(1, 96) = 7.11, p = .01), but not when choosing from the less appealing set 
(Mnovelty = 3.23 vs. Mcontrol = 3.36; F(1, 96) < 1, NS) (see Figure 1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of different snacks chosen (study 2). 
 
A 2 (novelty) x 2 (choice set) ANOVA on the number of consecutive switches 
found no significant main effects of choice set (F(1, 96) = 2.82, p = .10) or novelty 
(F(1, 96) < 1, NS), nor a significant interaction between the two variables (F(1, 96) = 
1.11, p = .30).  
Snack appeal. Next, we examined participants‟ ratings of the snack 
attractiveness. A two-way ANOVA on the snack-appeal index revealed a main effect 
of choice set, F(1, 96) = 103.84, p < .0001. Participants liked the snacks in the more 
appealing set significantly more (M = 4.70) than those in the less appealing set (M = 
2.82). There was also a significant main effect of novelty, F(1, 96) = 8.10, p = .005. 
Novelty participants perceived the snacks as significantly more appealing (Mnovelty = 
4.11 vs. Mcontrol = 3.55). These main effects were qualified again by a significant 
Novelty Control 
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interaction between choice set and novelty, F(1, 96) = 4.89, p < .05. Planned contrasts 
clarified that novelty participants perceived the snacks in the more appealing set as 
more attractive than did controls (Mnovelty = 5.20 vs. Mcontrol = 4.25, F(1, 96) = 13.70., p 
< .001) but did not differ from controls on the less appealing set (Mnovelty = 2.88 vs. 
Mcontrol = 2.76, F < 1, NS) (See Figure 2 on next page).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Snack appeal (Study 2) 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the effect of novelty on the diversity of subsequent choice 
observed in study 1, using a different novelty manipulation. People exposed to 
unfamiliar words selected a more diverse range of snacks in a following choice task, 
and also rated these snacks more positively. Importantly, these effects were moderated 
by the attractiveness of the available options. When the choice set contained, on 
average, less appealing snacks, novelty participants did not differ from controls in the 
diversity of their choice, or in the perceived attractiveness of the options.  
This data speaks against a simple priming account for the observed effect of 
novelty. If exposure to novelty primed the semantic concept of novelty or a behavioral 
Novelty Control 
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goal to choose more novel or diverse items, then the effect would have been observed 
when the choice items were less attractive, as well as when they were more attractive. 
Instead, our findings fit with the view that novelty promotes exploration in search of 
potentially rewarding options.  
We observed an effect of novelty only on the diversity-of-choice measure, and 
not on switching. Our hypotheses are focused on exploration, and thus diversity of the 
selected options is a better measure of exploration than switching. While one may 
switch among options simply to reduce boredom or satiation, more diverse choices 
may indicate a tendency to try more novel or unusual things (i.e., explore). The next 
study tests this proposition. 
 
Study 3 
 
Study 3 was designed to test whether prior exposure to novelty prompts people 
not only to choose more diverse options but also to try more unusual options.  
 
Method 
Forty-nine university students participated in this study, which used a 2 
(novelty: novelty vs. control) x 2 (snack type: typical snacks vs. unusual snacks) 
mixed-factor design, with novelty as a between-subjects factor, and snack type as a 
within-subjects factor.  
Novelty Manipulation. Novelty was manipulated through a word task, as in 
study 2. 
Snack type manipulation. The context for the choice task in this study was 
again choice of a vending-machine snack. To test our idea that the experience of 
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novelty may prompt exploration (i.e., trying unusual items), half of the snacks in the 
choice set were typical vending-machine snacks (Lay’s potato chips, RoldGold 
pretzels, Welch’s dried fruit snack), and the other half were unusual (Danon fruit-on-
the bottom yogurt, Quaker instant cereal, Campbell’s microwavable soup) for the 
context. The unusual snacks did not differ from the typical ones in terms of taste 
ratings (Mtypical = 4.95 vs. Munusual = 4.46, F(1, 52) = 1.65, p > .20), based on a pretest 
with 53 students from the same population as those in the main study. 
Procedure. Participants performed two tasks, both on computer: first the word-
associates task, which contained our manipulation of novelty, and then a choice task. 
In the choice task, participants were asked to assume that they were buying snacks 
from a vending machine and had to choose one from a set of six snacks, to have on 
each of the following ten days. Three of the snacks were the typical vending-machine 
snacks, and the other three were the less typical, as described earlier. The number of 
different items participants selected over the course of the ten choice trials served as a 
measure of choice diversity. After making the choices, participants were asked to 
indicate, for each of the six snacks in the choice set, how appealing that snack was (1 
= not at all appealing, 7 = very appealing), the degree to which it was a typical 
vending machine snack (1 = not at all typical, 7 = very typical).  
 
Results 
Manipulations checks. The success of the novelty manipulation was assessed 
as described in study 2. An ANOVA revealed that significantly fewer participants in 
the novelty condition gave identical associates than in the control condition (Mnovelty = 
2.59 vs. Mcontrol = 6.26; F(1, 47) = 95.79, p < .001). Furthermore, the associates 
provided by participants in the novelty condition did not differ significantly in valence 
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from those provided by controls (Mnovelty = .17 vs. Mcontrol = .02; F(1, 48) = 1.19, p > 
.20).   
Success of the typicality manipulation was established by averaging 
participants’ ratings of the representativeness of the two groups of snacks: chips, 
pretzels, and dried fruit (typical vending machine snack index, α = .60), and yogurt, 
cereal, and soup (unusual vending machine snack index, α = .66), as members of the 
category “vending machine snack.” A mixed-factor ANOVA with novelty as a 
between-subjects factor and snack type as a within-subjects factor revealed only a 
main within-subjects effect of snack type, (F(1, 47) = 70.72, p < .0001). Yogurt, 
cereal, and oatmeal were rated as significantly less typical as vending machine snacks 
(M = 2.58) than chips, pretzels, and dried fruit (M = 5.39). Neither novelty (F(1, 47) < 
1, NS), nor the interaction between snack type and novelty (F(1, 47) < 1, NS) was 
significant.  
Variety-seeking. A mixed ANOVA with the novelty manipulation (control 
words vs. novel words) as a between-subjects factor and the type of snack (typical vs. 
unusual) as a within-subjects factor, assessing the number of different snacks chosen, 
revealed two main effects, one of snack type (F(1, 47) = 8.05, p < .01), and one of 
novelty, F(1, 47) = 8.01, p < .01). Participants chose more different options from the 
typical snacks (M = 2.35) than from the unusual snacks (M = 1.88), and novelty 
participants chose more different snacks, overall, (M = 2.38) than did controls (M = 
1.84). The interaction between novelty and snack type was not significant, (F(1, 47) < 
1, NS), but planned contrasts were carried out to evaluate our hypotheses. These 
revealed that, unlike controls, novelty participants did not differ in their choice of 
snack as a function of snack type (Munusual = 2.20 vs. Mtypical = 2.56; t(49) = 1.36, p = 
.18). Furthermore, novelty participants chose more varied snacks than did controls, 
both when choosing from the typical snacks (Mnovelty = 2.56 vs. Mcontrol = 2.13, t(47) = 
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1.86, p < .05) and when choosing from the unusual snacks (Mnovelty = 2.20 vs. Mcontrol = 
1.54, t(47) = 2.40, p = .01) (See Figure 3 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of different snacks chosen (Study 3) 
 
A one-way ANOVA showed no significant difference in the number of times 
novelty participants switched among snacks (Mnovelty = 8.36 vs. Mcontrol = 7.50; F(1, 
47) = 2.88, p = .10) 
Snack appeal. A mixed ANOVA with the novelty manipulation as a between-
subjects factor and type of snack as a within-subjects factor, assessing the perceived 
appeal of the snacks, revealed a main effect of snack type; participants perceived the 
typical snacks as more appealing (M = 5.24) than the less typical snacks (M = 4.64; 
F(1, 47) = 11.55, p = .001). This main effect, however, was qualified by a significant 
interaction between the novelty induction and snack type (F(1, 47) = 4.22, p = .05). 
Planned contrasts revealed that the interaction was driven by only control participants’ 
ratings of the unusual snacks. Controls rated these snacks as significantly less 
appealing (M = 4.32) than the typical ones (M = 5.29; t(47) = 3.36, p = .001), but 
novelty participants’ ratings of the snacks’ attractiveness were not influenced by 
Novelty Control 
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typicality (Mnontypical = 4.95 vs. Mtypical = 5.19; t(48) < 1, NS). Furthermore, novelty 
participants’ ratings of the unusual snacks were significantly higher than those of 
controls (Mnovelty = 4.95 vs. Mcontrols = 4.32; t(48) = 2.22, p < .05), whereas their ratings 
of the typical snacks did not differ from controls’(Mnovelty = 5.19 vs. Mcontrol = 5.29; 
t(49) < 1, NS) (See Figure 4 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Snack appeal (Study 3) 
 
Discussion 
In this study, participants chose from a set of snacks that were all enjoyable, 
but half were typical vending machine snacks, while the other half were less typical. 
The typicality of the snacks affected control, but not novelty, participants’ choices and 
evaluations: controls rated the unusual vending machine snacks as less appealing than 
the typical ones and included fewer of them in their choice portfolio. Participants who 
had previously been exposed to novel words, in contrast, evaluated the less typical 
snacks as favorably as the typical ones, and included just as many of them in their 
choice portfolio. Novelty participants selected more diverse snacks, overall, than 
controls. This implies that prior exposure to novelty makes people more likely to try 
Novelty Control 
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more unusual options, as long as these options are attractive. They explore more 
among the unusual items, as well as among the typical ones. This also provides initial 
evidence that exposure to novelty may promote other types of consumer exploratory 
behavior such as innovativeness.  
As in study 2, we did not find an effect of prior novelty exposure on the 
number of times participants switched among options in the choice task. Both 
diversity of choice and switching have been used as measures of variety-seeking in the 
literature. However, it is possible that the choice diversity measure taps more directly 
into exploratory behavior and willingness to try new options, while one may alternate 
among options simply to reduce boredom. 
 
General Discussion 
 
The studies reported in this paper tested the hypotheses that exposure to 
novelty promotes exploration, manifested as choice of more diverse product options or 
as willingness to try more novel or unusual production options. Supporting this 
hypothesis, study 1 showed that participants who had engaged in a task involving 
novel images subsequently selected more diverse options from a set of snacks. 
Novelty participants also rated the snacks as significantly more appealing, and this 
enhanced appeal mediated the effect of novelty on choice diversity. Study 2 replicated 
these effects in the context of a series of choices, using a different novelty 
manipulation. It also demonstrated a boundary condition for the hypothesized effect of 
novelty on exploration, namely that this effect is observed only when the choice 
options are potentially rewarding. Participants who had provided associates to 
unfamiliar words (vs. familiar words), subsequently chose more diverse snacks, but 
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only when the snacks were appealing. When the perceived appeal of the snacks was 
limited, novelty participants did not differ significantly from controls in the diversity 
of their choice. Finally, study 3 demonstrated that exposure to novelty improves 
evaluations and promotes exploration among less typical, but still enjoyable, members 
of a product category, suggesting that novelty may also promote innovative consumer 
behavior.  
We did not find an effect of novelty exposure on the other measure of variety 
seeking, i.e. switching among options in the choice set. As mentioned earlier, it is 
possible that choice diversity is a better measure of exploratory behavior than 
switching. While one may switch among familiar options to reduce boredom, a 
broader range of choices may indicate willingness to try something new.  
Recent findings in the cognitive neuroscience literature suggest that novelty 
may serve as a reward-predicting cue that motivates exploration in search of valuable 
outcomes and that novelty amplifies reward signals in the brain (Guitart-Masip et al. 
2010; Krebs et al. 2009; Wittmann et al. 2008). Our finding that novelty improves 
evaluations and exploration among enjoyable product options, but not among 
unenjoyable ones, is in line with this view.  
An alternative explanation for the effects we observed involves the notion of 
cognitive flexibility. Exposure to novelty has been linked reliably to increased levels 
of the neurotransmitter dopamine (see Schultz 1998 for a review). Increased levels of 
dopamine, on the other hand, have been associated with enhanced cognitive flexibility 
(e.g., Ashby, Isen, and Turken 1999; Cohen, Braver, and Brown 2002).  Evidence is 
accumulating that exposure to novelty improves cognitive flexibility and learning 
(Davis, Jones, and Derrick 2004; Yerys and Munakata 2006). It is possible that 
enhancement in cognitive flexibility accounts, at least in part, for the effects observed 
in our studies. It may explain why, in study 3, participants who were exposed to novel 
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words, were later significantly more accepting of less typical members of the target 
product category.  The choice of more diverse options may also indicate greater 
cognitive flexibility, if it reflects a tendency to deviate from habitual choice patterns. 
An interesting test of this hypothesis might be to measure the extent to which one’s 
choices following novelty are likely to provide a habitual vs. an innovative response.  
The effects of novelty on choice diversity, observed in our studies, suggest 
parallels with the effects of positive affect on variety seeking. As we found for 
novelty, positive affect has been found to promote variety seeking among safe, 
enjoyable product options and to improve category-fit evaluations of less typical 
members of a category (Isen and Daubman 1984; Kahn and Isen 1993). These 
similarities imply that novelty and positive affect may share, at least in part, common 
underlying mechanisms.  In fact, a mechanism that has already been suggested to play 
a role in the influence of mild positive affect on cognition is release of dopamine into 
frontal brain regions and that process is also being suggested as important in the 
influence of novelty on cognition. Future research could investigate potential overlaps 
and differences in the effects of positive affect and novelty on cognition and behavior.  
The present research makes several theoretical contributions. It extends the 
existing literature on novelty by demonstrating that novelty produces contextual 
effects that extend beyond the novel items themselves. While a significant body of 
research has examined how the degree of novelty of an item influences processing, 
preferences, or choice of that item (e.g., Anand and Sternthal 1990; Berlyne 1960; 
Steenkamp and Gielens 2003), the downstream effects of novelty exposure on 
subsequent preferences and choice have received little attention. This manuscript is 
the first to demonstrate that the ability of novelty to promote exploration applies not 
only to the novel items themselves, but also to items encountered in a follow-up 
context.  
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The present manuscript contributes also to the literature on variety seeking and 
innovation at the individual consumer level. A significant portion of the work in these 
areas has focused on the role of demographic and personality variables that determine 
one’s propensity to seek variety or innovate, and on designing appropriate scales to 
measure these variables (e.g., Baumgartner and Steenkamp 1996; Raju 1980; 
Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992). Less has been done to investigate the influence of 
variables that are under the direct control of marketers (e.g., Barone et al. 2000; Kahn 
and Isen 1993). The present paper begins investigation of the effects of one such 
variable, exposure to novelty, on varied and innovative consumer behavior. 
Finally, by bringing together findings from several different literatures, the 
present research demonstrates how findings at the neurological level of analysis can be 
used to make predictions about effects that can be tested using traditional measures. It 
also suggests potential avenues for future research on the effects of exposure to 
novelty - a topic that is understudied in the consumer behavior literature, but that is of 
clear importance in this domain. 
It is obvious from observing marketing practice that novelty is of central 
concern to managers: firms constantly tout newness and novelty, from claims of 
“new,” to frequent changes in store displays, novel product introductions, and 
innovative advertising campaigns. The present work helps to illuminate why marketers 
place such emphasis on novelty: it has powerful effects on product choice and 
evaluations. The present studies suggest that when a firm introduces novelty, this may 
affect not only preference and choice of the novel product lines, packaging, brochures, 
etc, but also preferences, choice, and sales of existing products. Specifically, novel 
introductions may prompt consumers to seek diversity and try a broader range of 
product options. This should benefit a firm that already has varied product lines, since 
novelty will likely stimulate trial and purchase of more of its existing product options. 
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The results from our studies also suggest that a novel context such as a novel website 
of an online retailer, or novel décor or layout of a traditional retailer, may make 
consumers more open to, and may thus facilitate, trial and adoption of both new and 
not-so-new products. If a firm’s existing product lines, however, are limited, novelty 
may decrease loyalty and prompt consumers to try competitors’ products. Thus, this 
work suggests that firms should extend their product lines, in order to give customers 
the opportunity to obtain variety within the brand, especially if the firm’s products 
feature newness. These, and many other questions, remain to be explored.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EVIDENCE FOR REWARD CIRCUITS IN THE BRAIN 
 
Most animals and humans have a propensity to seek out and approach objects 
or events that have appetitive (rewarding) value and to avoid those that have aversive 
(punishing) value. Psychologists have long recognized the existence of these action or 
motivational tendencies and have attributed them to the functioning of two distinct 
systems for the regulation of human behavior. One system is involved in appetitive 
motivation and approach behavior and has been termed a behavioral approach system 
(e.g., Gray 1990). A second system deals with aversive motivation and avoidance 
behavior, and is mostly known as a behavioral inhibition system (Gray 1990). The 
approach and inhibition systems are believed to have partially distinct neural 
substrates and to exert distinct influences on behavior (Carver 2006).  
The concept of “reward” is central to understanding the approach system and 
appetitive behavior. Some researchers have proposed that reward is not a unitary 
concept and that rewards involve functionally distinct components. For example, 
Schultz (1998) has suggested that one function of rewards is to induce subjective 
feelings of pleasure and positive affective states, a second function is to increase the 
frequency and intensity of behavior leading to such objects (learning), and a third 
function is to elicit approach and consummatory behavior. Similarly, Berridge and 
Robinson (2003) have proposed that rewards are associated with functionally separate 
feeling (what they call “liking”), learning, and motivational (“wanting”) components.  
While there may be no final agreement over the exact components of rewards, it may 
be useful to keep the above described distinctions in mind since they are reflected in 
the literature on the brain mechanisms of reward. For example, theories about the 
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functions of the neurotransmitter dopamine have linked it to different aspects of 
rewards: some have implicated dopamine in the pleasant feelings accompanying 
reward (e.g., Wise 1980, 1982), others have argued for a role of dopamine in learning 
(e.g., Schultz 1998), and others – for a role of dopamine in motivated behavior (e.g., 
Berridge and Robinson 1998). Research exploring the exact mechanisms through 
which dopamine mediates reward processing is still ongoing. The present paper 
reviews some of the more prominent theories about the role of dopamine in reward 
processing. We also review evidence for the involvement of other brain areas and 
circuits in reward processing and outline some of the related controversies and 
outstanding issues.  
 
Neural Representations of Reward: Evidence for the Role of Dopamine 
 
The neurotransmitter dopamine (DA) has long been implicated in mediating 
the rewarding effects of natural stimuli. DA neurons are located mostly in the 
substantia nigra (SN) and the medially adjoining midbrain ventral tegmental area 
(VTA), in groups numbered A8 to A10. The nigrostriatal dopamine system consists of 
DA-producing cells in the SN pars compacta that project into the dorsal striatum (the 
input structure of the basal ganglia that consists of the caudate nucleus and putamen). 
This system is considered crucial for the regulation of motor functions, although 
evidence suggests its possible implication in cognitive functions such as learning 
(Kimura and Matsumoto 1997). The mesocorticolimbic dopamine system consists of 
DA-producing cells in the VTA that project to cortical and limbic areas such as the 
prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate, the ventral striatum (with the nucleus 
accumbens), the amygdala, the hippocampus, the olfactory bulb and cortex, and locus 
ceruleus. This system has been primarily associated with reward and motivation.  
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Several lines of evidence have implicated DA neurons, in particular those in 
the VTA, as well as neurons in DA-receiving structures such as nucleus accumbens 
and the prefrontal cortex (in particular the orbitofrontal cortex) in reward processing. 
First, drugs of abuse such as morphine, cocaine, or amphetamines influence DA 
neurotransmission by increasing DA concentration in the ventral striatum and frontal 
cortex, which appears to be a critical mechanism of drug addiction (Wise 1996a; Wise 
1996b). Conversely, DA antagonists (e.g., neuroleptics) attenuate the rewarding 
effects of food and other reinforcers (Wise 1982). Second, studies of electrical self-
stimulation reveal that many of the stimulation sites are in close proximity to axons of 
DA neurons or to axons presynaptic to them and intra-nucleus accumbens injections of 
DA antagonists disrupt self-stimulation behavior (see Ikemoto and Panksepp 1999 for 
a review). Furthermore, studies investigating the neuronal mechanisms of reward by 
observing the impulse activity of single DA neurons in the VTA show that DA 
neurons are activated by the rewarding characteristics of a wide range of 
somatosensory, visual, and auditory stimuli (Schultz 1998). About 75% of DA 
neurons show phasic activations following primary food and liquid rewards and a 
slightly smaller percentage of the DA population (55 - 70%) responds also to 
conditioned, reward-predicting stimuli (Schultz 1998). Only 11-14% of DA neurons 
show activations following primary aversive stimuli (e.g. air puff, electric shock, or 
tail pinch) or conditioned aversive visual or auditory stimuli (Mirenowicz and Schultz 
1996; Schultz and Romo 1987), suggesting that the phasic responses of neurons 
“preferentially report environmental stimuli with appetitive value” (Schultz 1998).  
Neurons in the dorsal and ventral striatum, structures that receive dense DA 
projections from the SN and VTA respectively, have also been shown to increase 
activity in anticipation of as well as following reward delivery (Schultz et al. 1992). 
Finally, indirect evidence for the involvement of DA in reward processing comes from 
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a number of neuroimaging studies with humans that show activations in brain regions 
that receive direct VTA DA projections such as the nucleus accumbens, the amygdala, 
the orbitorfrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex, in anticipation of or during 
exposure to a wide range of rewarding stimuli (e.g., Aharon et al. 2001; Blood et al. 
1999; Breiter et al. 2001; Menon and Levin 2005; Mobbs et al. 2003) or during 
reward-related decision making tasks (Bush et al. 2002).   
The exact role of DA in reward-processing has been the subject of heated 
discussions (see Berridge 2007; Salamone 2007). Different theories have been 
proposed and while there seems to be more agreement now over some issues (e.g., that 
DA probably is not directly involved in the pleasant feelings associated with reward) 
still a lot of questions remain open.  In this paper we review some of the more 
prominent hypothesis for the role DA in reward mechanisms. 
 
The Role of Dopamine in the Pleasure Component of Reward Processing 
 Arguments Supporting the Anhedonia Hypothesis. Early theories implicated 
the neurotransmitter DA as the primary neural substrate of pleasure or hedonia (Wise 
1980; 1982). Most prominent among these theories was the so called “anhedonia 
hypothesis” proposed by Roy Wise (Wise 1980; 1982). In the earlier and stronger 
version of this hypothesis, it was suggested that “the dopamine junctions represent a 
synaptic way station… where sensory inputs are translated into the hedonic messages 
we experience as pleasure, euphoria or „yumminess‟” (Wise 1980, p. 94). Later, 
however, Wise and his colleagues revised their position to say that the blockade of DA 
attenuates above all the motivational impact of positive reinforcers and that the 
evidence suggesting that neuroleptics disrupt the subjective hedonic effects of 
rewarding stimuli is mixed (Wise 1985).   
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The DA theory of positive affect advanced by Ashby, Isen and Turken (1999) 
proposes that positive affect is associated with increased brain levels of DA, but does 
not assume that the release of DA induces the pleasant feelings that accompany the 
experience of positive affect. Rather, the authors suggest, DA mediates some of the 
cognitive effects that have been observed with positive affect such as enhanced 
cognitive flexibility and facilitated creative problem solving through its influence on 
target sites such as the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate.  
The theory that argues most strongly against DA‟s role in mediating pleasure 
and positive affect is the incentive salience theory proposed by Kent Berridge and his 
colleagues (Berridge and Robinson 1998; Robinson and Berridge 1993). The incentive 
salience theory makes a distinction between the hedonic (what they call “liking”) 
impact of rewards and their motivational (or “wanting”) aspects and claims that DA 
mediates the motivational “wanting” component but not the pleasure-related “liking” 
component of rewards.  
What is some of the evidence that has been brought against a causal role of DA 
in reward-related pleasure? 
Arguments against the Anhedonia Hypothesis. A number of arguments have 
been brought against the hypothesis that DA is directly involved in the pleasant 
feelings associated with rewards. A prominent line of argumentation comes from Kent 
Berridge and his colleagues. They reported data showing that fundamental reactions to 
sucrose (tongue protrusions, licking) or bitter tastes (gapes) are not affected by 
dopaminergic lesions or by neuroleptic drugs (Berridge, Venier, and Robinson 1989). 
Even massive lesions that eliminate nearly all DA in the NAc and striatum of 
experimental rats fail to disrupt expressions of taste “liking” although they attenuate 
the animal‟s motivation to work for obtaining the sweet reward (“wanting”) (Berridge 
and Robinson 1998). Conversely, increases in extracellular DA in mutant mice do not 
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increase hedonic “liking” reactions to sucrose (Pecina et al. 2003). Berridge and 
colleagues have argued that facial reactions to natural rewards such as sucrose are 
homologous across rodents, primates, and human infants and represent objective 
indicators of the hedonic impact of these rewards. Failure of DA manipulations to 
affect these expressions, therefore, is interpreted as evidence against DA‟s 
involvement in the pleasure aspect of rewards. Other researchers, however, have 
pointed out that the facial expressions observed in infants and rats in response to sweet 
taste may be related to stereotyped fixed action patterns of ingestion rather than to 
forebrain mechanisms of motivation and emotion (Wise 2004). Furthermore, the fact 
that increases in extracellular DA fail to increase “liking” reactions cannot be 
interpreted unequivocally, since there may be a ceiling effect and furthermore it is not 
clear that the relationship between DA levels and reward is a linear one.  
A more convincing line of argumentation against DA‟s mediating role in 
reward-related pleasure comes from electrophysiological studies with animals by 
Schultz and colleagues (e. g., Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997) which show that 
DA neurons fire in response to rewards only during the first few presentations of the 
reward, while the reward is not fully predicted. Over the course of learning, the DA 
response gradually shifts towards the earliest conditioned stimulus predicting the 
reward and no firing at all is observed at the time of receipt of a reward that has been 
fully learned. This pattern of activation suggests that the DA response tracks a 
component of reward other than pleasure, since the pleasure impact should not 
completely disappear with learning.  
Furthermore, DA neurons have been observed to respond strongly to 
intrinsically neutral novel stimuli and salient attention-grabbing stimuli such as loud 
clicks or large pictures (Ljungberg, Apicella, and Schultz 1992). A certain percentage 
of DA neurons respond also to conditioned aversive visual or auditory stimuli in 
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active avoidance tasks in which animals release a key to avoid an air puff or a drop of 
hypertonic saline (Mirenowicz and Shultz 1996). It is possible that both of these types 
of DA activation are reward related. For example, novelty itself may have reward 
value or may be potentially rewarding, in the sense that it motivates exploration in the 
search for potential reinforcers (Bunzeck and Duzel 2006). This latter possibility is 
supported by the observation that novelty responses decay gradually with repeated 
exposure but increase again if the stimulus is appetitively conditioned and subside 
rapidly if the stimulus is used for conditioning active avoidance behavior (Schultz 
1998). There is no consensus regarding DA reactions to aversive stimuli in active 
avoidance tasks, however it seems possible that DA neurons may be responding to the 
rewarding aspect of relief from the aversive stimuli. Whatever the explanation for the 
novelty and the aversive DA responses, it is clear that these responses reflect an aspect 
of reward that is not pleasure related.   
Another line of argumentation against the mediating role of DA in pleasure 
comes from the observation that there is rapid within-session tolerance to the 
subjective pleasure of rewarding drugs like cocaine, morphine, and nicotine, but there 
is little or no decrease in the ability of these drugs to sustain repeated and regular self-
administration (Wize 2004). Finally, low doses of cocaine can control behavior even 
when they are subjectively indistinguishable from placebo (Martinez et al. 2004) and 
brain imaging studies have indicated that stimulant-induced euphoria is only loosely 
correlated with the degree of drug-induced DA release (Volkow 1999).  
Thus there seems to be a growing body of evidence suggesting that DA maybe 
neither necessary nor sufficient to cause the sensory pleasure and the positive feelings 
associated with rewards. This component of rewards must then be mediated by a 
different neural substrate. What are some possible candidates that have been 
proposed? 
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Alternative Hypotheses. Researchers have suggested that the pleasant feelings 
associated with rewards may be mediated by forebrain opioid circuits involving 
structures such as the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and the ventral pallidum, and 
possibly the orbitofrontal cortex. NAc and the ventral palidum, located within the 
ventral forebrain and sharing reciprocal projections with one another, are considered 
to be part of the brain opioid system (Pecina, Smith, and Berridge 2006). Berridge and 
colleagues (Pecina and Berridge 2005; Smith and Berridge 2005) have suggested that 
each of these structures contains an anatomical subregion, a “hedonic hot spot” in 
which opioids amplify significantly the hedonic impact of sensory pleasure. In 
particular, Pecina and Berridge (2005) report that they have identified a 1-mm
3
 – site 
within the medial shell subregion of NAc where a microinjection of the μ-opioid 
agonist DAMGO caused sucrose taste infusions into the rat‟s mouth to elicit up to 
quadruple the usual number of positive “liking” reactions such as licking and tongue 
protrusion. DAMGO injections in other areas of NAc stimulated a “wanting” for food 
as reflected in increased food intake, but did not increase “liking” reactions. Pecina 
and Berridge (2005) concluded that this particular “hot spot” in NAc possesses the 
ability to enhance positive hedonic impact. Another region that has been suggested as 
a likely candidate for a “hedonic hot spot” is in the caudal portion of the ventral 
pallidum – a region that is the chief output target of the NAc projections (Pecina et al. 
2006). The features of this area are similar to those of NAc. Microinjections of the μ-
opioid agonist DAMGO in the ventral pallidum of rats were also found to double the 
number of hedonic “liking” reactions to a sucrose taste (Smith and Berridge 2005). 
Smith and Berridge (2007) recently reported that they observed significant interaction 
between NAc and ventral pallidum activation in rats, in the sense that activation of one 
area recruited activation in the other and the two areas were needed together to 
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enhance sucrose "liking" reactions, essentially cooperating within a single NAc-
ventral pallidum circuit.  
The above described evidence for the existence of “hedonic hot spots” in the 
NAc and the ventral pallidum is still preliminary. First, it comes only from rodents and 
it is not clear that similar effects will be observed with human subjects. Second, it is 
not clear how exactly the proposed areas amplify the observed reward-related 
experiences of pleasure. Berridge and his colleagues have suggested that it may be 
through the increased density of μ-opioid receptors in these regions, but the exact 
mechanism is not clear. Third, the interpretation of the evidence is based on the 
assumption that facial reactions to sweet tastes represent an objective measure of 
hedonic impact. As pointed out earlier, it is quite possible that such expressions are in 
fact fixed action patterns of ingestion. Further research is needed to clarify the role of 
the above described regions in mediating pleasure and also to explore the role of 
forebrain opioid circuits in this process.   
In summary, there seems to be a growing consensus among researchers that 
DA does not mediate the hedonic component of rewards. Forebrain opioids have been 
proposed as a possible alternative, and it has been suggested that brain areas rich in 
opioid receptors form networks that coordinate multiple such hedonic “hotspots.” 
Further research is needed to identify likely members of these networks and to clarify 
the underlying mechanisms, including other possible neurotransmitters, through which 
such regions may cause or amplify the hedonic impact of rewards. 
 
The Role of Dopamine in the Learning Component of Reward Processing  
Arguments supporting a role of dopamine in learning. The value of some 
rewards (primary, or unconditioned rewards) may be determined by innate instincts 
and support initial approach behavior and ingestion in early life. These include, for 
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example, the preference for an optimal temperature range, the preference for sweet 
and the rejection of bitter substances.  The majority of rewards, however, acquire their 
appetitive value through associative learning during the life experience of the 
organism. Associative appetitive learning involves basic Pavlovian stimulus-stimulus 
(S-S) or stimulus – response (S-R) conditioning, or instrumental conditioning 
(response-contingent reinforcement). In Pavlovian conditioning, a neutral stimulus 
(the conditioned stimulus, CS) is presented repeatedly along with a primary 
unconditioned reward (UCS). With time, the CS starts eliciting conditioned responses 
(CRs) which can be anticipatory responses, behavioral habits, or even conditioned 
motivations and emotions appropriate to the UCS. In instrumental conditioning, the 
behavioral response itself becomes associated with the reward and obtains appetitive 
value. Thus in the instrumental form of incentive learning, rewards become 
“incentives” and serve as goals of behavior following associations between behavioral 
responses and outcome – the common notion of rewards being obtained for having 
done something well. Higher forms of learning, of course, are more elaborate and 
involve multiple relationships among stimuli and actions, including representations of 
temporal, spatial, predictive and causal relationships that guide goal-directed plans of 
action.  
Associative learning depends on the discrepancy between the occurrence of a 
reward and its prediction. The importance of such prediction errors is derived from 
Kamin‟s blocking effect (1969) which postulates that a reward that is fully predicted 
does not contribute to the learning of a stimulus or action, even when it has been 
repeatedly paired with the stimulus or action. This is conceptualized in the associative 
Rescorla-Wagner learning rules (Rescorla & Wagner 1972), according to which 
learning advances only to the extent to which a reinforcer is unpredicted and slows 
down progressively as the reinforcer becomes more predicted. The omission of a 
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predicted reinforcer reduces the strength of the CS and produces extinction of 
behavior.  
 Data from a series of electrophysiological studies examining the relationship 
between phasic activation of DA neurons and the presentation of rewards and reward-
predicting stimuli suggests that the DA system maybe well-suited to mediate reward 
learning, and in particular prediction-error based learning (Ljungberg, Apicella, and 
Schultz 1991, 1992; Mirenowicz and Schultz 1994, 1996). 
The characteristics of the phasic DA response to reward-related stimuli are best 
illustrated in learning episodes during which rewards are important for acquiring 
behavioral responses. The DA reward signal has been shown to undergo systematic 
changes during the progress of learning (Ljungberg et al. 1992; Mirenowicz and 
Schultz 1994). Primary rewards elicit neuronal activations during initial learning 
periods which decrease gradually and are transferred to the conditioned, reward-
predicting stimulus. If a predicted reward fails to occur, DA neurons are depressed at 
the time the reward would have occurred. With increased learning, activation transfers 
from the primary reward to the earliest conditioned stimulus. Subsequently appearing 
conditioned stimuli and primary rewards activate DA neurons only transiently while 
they are uncertain and new contingencies are being established (Schultz 1998). Thus 
reward unpredictability is a crucial feature of the phasic DA response. This feature has 
been termed “reward-prediction error” (Schultz et al. 1995, 1997) and has been 
formalized as follows: 
Dopamine Response (Reward) = Reward Occurred – Reward Predicted.  
The criterion of unpredictability includes the time of reward, as well as the 
magnitude of the reward. Specifically, Hollerman and Schultz (1998) demonstrated 
that rewards elicit transient activations when they are delivered earlier or later than 
predicted (Hollerman and Schultz 1998). Tobler, Fiorillo, and Schultz (2005) showed 
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that DA neurons process also received-reward magnitude relative to a predicted 
magnitude. For example, in one of their experiments, macaque monkeys learned the 
association between neutral stimuli and the probability of delivery of liquid reward 
(fruit juice) in three possible volumes: small, medium, and large. One stimulus 
predicted that either the small or the medium volume of juice would be delivered with 
equal probability, whereas another stimulus predicted either the medium or the large 
volume with equal probability. In both cases, delivery of the larger of the two potential 
volumes elicited an increase in DA activity, whereas the smaller volume elicited a 
decrease. Thus a reward outcome that is positive on an absolute value scale can 
nonetheless suppress the activity of DA neurons. 
Schultz (2002) has suggested that the phasic DA reward-predicting signal 
exerts an enhancing and focusing effect in other cortical structures such as the striatum 
and the prefrontal cortex by increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of active inputs to 
neurons in these structures. In particular, the DA signal presumably modifies the ways 
in which other simultaneous inputs influence post-synaptic neurons, by prioritizing 
reward-related inputs over other inputs. As a consequence, the phasic DA signal is 
proposed to produce a rapid switch of attentional and behavioral processing to reward-
predicting events that may lead to Hebbian-type plasticity at synapses in the stratum 
and cortex and thus may facilitate long-term potentiation. A similar view of DA‟s role 
in reward learning has also been expressed by Cohen, Braver, and Brown (2002) who 
suggest that the phasic DA signal has two functions in the prefrontal cortex: an 
updating function and a reinforcement learning function. In their updating function, 
phasic bursts of DA activity function as a “gating mechanism” by signaling when 
input should be selected and stored in the PFC, updating the contents of working 
memory to convey important reward-related information. This occurs through the 
transient potentiation of both excitatory afferent and local inhibitory effects in the 
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PFC. The learning effect occurs through modulation of synaptic weights, driven by the 
error-prediction signal carried by phasic DA release.  
Arguments against dopamine’s role in reward learning. Some researchers have 
expressed skepticism regarding the causal role of DA in reward learning (Berridge 
2007). While admitting that DA makes “many indirect contributions to both learning 
and learned performance” Berridge and colleagues have questioned whether 
“dopamine activation causes the rest of the brain to learn, or instead, whether learning 
by other brain systems causes dopamine activation” (Berridge 2007, p. 399). The 
alternative view they propose is that DA activation is an “output consequence of 
learning mechanisms operating elsewhere, rather than a causal mechanism for 
learning” (Berridge 2007, p. 399). The argument put forth by these authors against 
DA‟s mediating role in learning is based on data from experiments with rodents with 
depleted DA or with genetic inability to produce DA who still exhibit the ability to 
learn a reward preference (Berridge and Robinson 1998; Cannon and Palmiter 2003). 
For example, rats with 99% of their nucleus accumbens and the striatum DA depleted 
reportedly were still able to acquire and express an associative shift from hedonic 
reactions to aversion towards a stimulus that was originally paired with a reward 
(saccharine solution) but was subsequently paired with illness (Berridge and Robinson 
1998).  Similarly, Cannon and Palmiter (2003) report that mutant mice with a genetic 
inability to produce DA were still able to learn a preference for a spout that delivered 
sucrose solution over one that delivered water, even though they had virtually no DA 
in their brains. When the DA deficient (DD) mice drank, they drank more sucrose, and 
this preference was proportionally equal to that of control mice. However, the strength 
of these results is undermined by the fact that they were obtained after excluding 4 
(out of 12 total) DD mice who actually did not drink at all, and the remaining 8 mice 
drank during only 1.6 out of the 4 tests. Furthermore, as pointed out by Ikemoto and 
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Panksepp (1999), conditioned taste preference/aversion is only one of many examples 
of Pavlovian conditioning, therefore these results should not be taken as proof that DA 
is not involved in other types of learning. In another recent paper, Cagniard and 
colleagues (Cagniard et al. 2006) also argue against DA‟s causal role in reward 
learning, basing their argument on evidence that increases in DA neurotransmission 
fail to cause better or faster learning about rewards. Specifically, in their studies DAT-
knockdown mutant mice that had elevated extracellular DA levels of 170% above 
control mice failed to learn a Pavlovian conditioned approach association to a food 
dish faster than control mice, nor did they learn to bar press for food reward in an 
instrumental task any more quickly than wild-type mice. These results, however, 
should be interpreted with caution as it is not clear that the relationship between DA 
levels and learning is a linear one. It may well be that some intermediate level of DA 
(neither too low nor too high) is optimal for the facilitation of reward-related learning. 
In fact, it has been previously suggested that the effects of DA modulation on 
performance are non-monotonic: both too little and too much DA impair working 
memory performance (Cohen, Braver, and Brown 2002; Williams and Goldman-Rakic 
1995), and phasic DA effects may further be dependent on tonic baseline levels of DA 
activation (Cohen, Braver, and Brown 2002).  
Thus although some researchers have challenged DA‟s role in reward learning, 
the majority of evidence still points to a key role of DA in these processes. If the DA 
signal is not a direct cause of learning but rather a consequence of learning, as 
suggested by Berridge (2007), it is not clear where else in the brain reward learning 
first originates. In fact, characteristics of the phasic dopamine signal, with its 
sensitivity to differences in expected and obtained reward make it the most plausible 
candidate for explaining learning without the danger of introducing regress in the 
process.  
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The Role of Dopamine in the Motivational Component of Reward Processing 
Several lines of evidence suggest that DA mediates the motivational 
component of rewards and that it is through DA signaling that a neutral stimulus is 
converted into an attractive one capable of eliciting approach behavior. For example, 
manipulations of DA and related mesolimbic circuits in animals induce powerful 
changes in the observed instrumental performance of these animals for food, drugs, 
and electrical brain stimulation (Salamone 1994; Wise 1982; 1985). Specifically, 
Salamone and colleagues demonstrated that rats with 6-OHDA-induced DA depletion 
of the NAc forgo the opportunity to press a lever for preferred food, instead 
consuming more of a less preferred but freely available food (Salamone et al. 1994). It 
is now generally accepted that the changes in approach behavior elicited by 
suppression of DA neurotransmission reflect motivational and not simply motor 
deficits (Robinson and Berridge 1993). Rats with extensive destruction of the DA 
system starve to death unless nourished artificially, even though food is readily 
available and even though they retain the motor capacity to walk, chew, swallow, and 
perform other movements necessary for eating (Berridge, Venier, and Robinson 1989). 
Conversely, administering amphetamine injections directly into the NAc of rats causes 
increases in “wanting” for sucrose reward as measured by the rate of lever pressing to 
obtain the reward (Wyvell and Berridge 2000). Indirect facilitation of DA 
neurotransmission by electrical brain stimulation also increases the seeking behavior 
and the actual ingestion of palatable food, even though there is no increase in the 
hedonic impact of food as measured by changes in facial reactions to the food (Wyvell 
and Berridge 2000).  
Based on the above evidence, Berridge and colleagues have proposed that 
dopamine mediates the motivational component of rewards - an idea captured in the 
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incentive salience hypothesis of DA function (Berridge and Robinson 1998; Robinson 
and Berridge 2003). Incentive salience is defined as the process through which sensory 
information about rewards and their cues are transformed into “attractive, desired, and 
riveting incentives” (Berridge and Robinson 2003, p. 510) and through which stimuli 
become “wanted” and able to elicit voluntary action. Incentive salience or “wanting,” 
as defined by Berridge and Robinson (1998), is separate from hedonic “liking” or 
sensory pleasure, and is also separate from learning, although “it takes all three types 
of components coordination together to produce the full phenomenon we usually think 
of as reward” (Berridge 2007, p. 408). The hypothesis proposes that the DA system is 
necessary for the attribution of incentive salience to stimuli, but not for hedonic 
activation or for the learning of reward-related associations.  
Berridge and Robinson‟s arguments are based primarily on evidence that 
dopaminergic deficits impair the instrumental behavior of animals for rewards but do 
not impair taste reactivity reactions. Some authors, however (Ikemoto and Panksepp 
1999; Wise 2004), have pointed out that if it is only the motivational component of 
reward that is compromised under neuroleptics or other forms of dopamine 
impairment, then responding to rewards should not be normal from the very beginning 
of neuroleptic treatment. Studies however show that neuroleptic-treated animals 
usually continue to approach rewards and reward-predicting stimuli until they have 
had a considerable experience with the reward under the influence of the neuroleptic 
(Wise 1982). Wise argues that the fact that responding decreases gradually and only 
after an initial experience with the reward under the neuroleptic influence suggests 
that it is more than just the motivational component that is being affected (Ikemoto 
and Panskepp 1999; Wise 2004). Thus it is not clear that a clean distinction between 
the motivational and the other functions of dopamine in reward processing is feasible. 
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It may be rather that dopamine functions in a more complex way affecting different 
reward-related processes simultaneously.  
Some researchers have suggested that all stimuli that are salient or have 
motivational significance, and not only those with rewarding properties, activate DA 
neurons (Redgrave, Prescott, and Gurney 1999). For example, as mentioned before, 
physically salient sensory stimuli such as tones and lights have been shown to evoke 
rapid, phasic excitations in DA neurons (Ljungberg, Apicella, and Schultz 1992). 
Also, novel stimuli of neutral valence can also evoke DA release (Schultz 1998). 
However, if DA activations coded all salient and motivationally relevant events, then 
we should not observe depression of DA activation following the omission of a 
predicted reward which in itself represents a salient event with motivational 
consequences. Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that DA release to novel 
stimuli may reflect the fact that novelty can be rewarding (Kakade and Dayan 2002) 
which is consistent with research in social psychology suggesting that moderate 
novelty can be rewarding (Berlyne 1970).  
 
Dopamine: Outstanding Issues 
While each of the above described theories of DA highlights a certain aspect of 
its role in reward processing, none of these theories can comprehensively account for 
all of DA‟s functions. Many issues still remain to be clarified. One issue we haven‟t 
mentioned so far concerns the distinction between phasic and tonic DA signals, and 
their respective function. In addition to the fast and short-lasting phasic dopaminergic 
activations that have been the target of investigation in most electrophysiological 
studies of DA function, DA neurons exhibit also sustained tonic activations. There is 
no clear agreement on the definition and functions of tonic DA response. Grace (1991) 
defines phasic DA release as the quick (within milliseconds) release of DA from axon 
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terminals into the synaptic cleft in response to action potentials, and tonic DA release 
as the extrasynaptic concentration of DA that is independent of phasic activations and 
occurs much slower, over period of tens of minutes to hours or days. It has been 
suggested that tonic DA levels modulate the phasic DA response (Grace 1991). 
Studies by Lisman and Grace (2005) suggest that novelty-related increases in tonic 
DA inputs in the hippocampus facilitate long-term potentiation (LTP) and memory 
encoding. Yet others have proposed that tonic changes in DA levels may play a critical 
role in motivation and affect (Ikemoto 2007). The current literature does not offer 
sufficient information on the functional relation between tonic and phasic DA or on 
the possible role of tonic DA for reward processing.  
To complicate things even further, recent work by Tobler et al. (2005) suggests 
the existence of yet a third type of DA response – an “intermediate” response which 
occurs in the time between the onset of a conditioned stimulus and the delivery (or 
omission) of a reward. Electrophysiological responses of single midbrain DA neurons 
were recorded from adult macaca monkeys who were trained in a classical 
conditioning procedure to respond to conditioned stimuli associated with distinct 
reward probabilities (0.0, .25, .50, .75, or 1.0). A sustained activation of DA neurons 
was recorded that seemed to be independent of the phasic DA response. This slower 
response was highest when the probability of reward was 0.5 and was minimal at the 
two endpoints of probability (0 or 1). It occurred only for motivationally relevant 
stimuli: no sustained activation was observed when the animal was exposed to 
probability/uncertainty patterns for reward-unrelated stimuli. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the sustained response seemed to be proportional to the discrepancy 
between potential rewards: it was strongest after a stimulus predicting either a small or 
a large reward (a large discrepancy), and was significantly weaker for smaller 
discrepancy combinations (small – medium, and medium – large). Tobler and his 
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colleagues suggested that these results have significant implications for understanding 
the psychological mechanisms of gambling: the allure of gambling may well come 
partially from the uncertainty of the gains. Just as the monkey neurons in the 
experiment responded most strongly to the most discrepant potential rewards, so in 
gambling one may be drawn in by the extreme prospects of a loss or a jackpot. The 
relation of the response to predicted reward discrepancy may also have important 
implications for learning. Tobler et al. (2005) hypothesize that the sustained activation 
of DA neurons may play a role in mobilizing attention and facilitating learning.  The 
organism has the most to learn when uncertainty is highest – hence the peak response 
at P = .5. Along the same lines, one could say that the organism has more to learn the 
wider the range of potential outcomes. It would be important for the organism to 
figure out the pattern of a stimulus that can predict both a very small and a very large 
reward. Thus a situation characterized by the highest degree of uncertainty: probability 
of reward = .5 coupled with the widest range of potential reward outcomes, should 
induce the largest amount of sustained DA activation. It would be interesting to test 
these ideas in a decision-making study with human participants. 
 
Neural Representations of Rewards: Evidence for the Existence of Reward 
Circuits 
 
Types of Reward Circuits and Their Components 
 So far we have reviewed evidence for the direct involvement of DA neurons 
in reward processing. As mentioned earlier, however, DA neurons in the VTA project 
to a number of brain structures among which the NAc, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the hippocampus, and the olfactory 
tubercle. Evidence suggests that these structures are also involved in reward 
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processing and that, together with VTA DA neurons, they form neural circuits for 
reward.  
The mesolimbic dopamine system involves dopamine projects from the VTA to 
structures considered part of the limbic system such as the NAc, the amygdala, the 
hippocampus, and the olfactory tubercle. This system is considered to be involved in 
reward processing.  
Many lines of evidence suggest that the nucleus accumbens plays an important 
role in mediating reward effects. For example, animals self-administer DA agonists or 
drugs that increase DA levels like amphetamines directly into the NAc; given a choice 
between environments where animals previously received microinjections of DA 
agonists (vs. vehicle) into the NAc, animals spend more time in the drug-paired 
environments; intra-NAc injections of amphetamines facilitate self-stimulation 
behavior, while administration of DA antagonists disrupts such behavior and these 
effects are not simply due to motoric effects of self-stimulation; DA depletion by 
lesions in the NAc abolishes or severly disrupts intravenous self-administration of 
psychostimulant drugs (see Ikemoto and Panksepp 1999 for a comprehensive review). 
Furthermore, single-neuron studies with monkeys have shown that NAc neurons are 
activated during the expectation of primary rewards (Schultz et al. 1992). Bardo et al. 
(1996) suggested that NAc is involved in novelty-seeking behavior, in anticipation of 
possible rewards. When NAc-DA depleted rats and control rats are tested in an 
environment with salient stimuli (novel stimuli and incentive stimuli), the control 
animals exhibit heightened locomotor activity toward the salient stimulus, while NAs-
DA depleted animals do not readily respond to such stimuli, although they do not 
exhibit general locomotor deficits. The authors suggest that these results imply a 
failure on the part of the NAc-DA deficient animals to initiate approach and 
exploratory responses in the presence of salient environmental stimuli. A similar view 
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is expressed by Ikemoto and Panksepp (1999) who have suggested that the primary 
role of NAc DA is to respond to novelty and to “focus the sensorimotor apparatus into 
approach, seeking, and investigatory activities directed toward novel events, especially 
if they are related to rewards (Ikemoto and Panksepp 1999, p. 33).   
The role of the amygdala in processing reward is not clear. This structure has 
traditionally been implicated in the processing of negative, unpleasant emotions such 
as fear and in associating environmental stimuli with emotionally charged, aversive 
sensory outputs (Baxter and Murray 2002). Recently, claims have been made for a role 
of the amygdala in the processing of pleasant stimuli. For example, O‟Doherty et al. 
(2001) reported fMRI evidence suggesting that the human amygdala is activated by 
pleasant as well as aversive tastes. In five out of seven subjects, the amygdala was 
activated by the pleasant taste of glucose, and four out of seven showed activations by 
the aversive taste of salt. Also, Rolls et al. (2003) reported that activation by pleasant 
touch was produced in an area in or near the amygdala. Still, the majority of studies 
have failed to observe increases in amygdala activation to the presentation of 
rewarding positive stimuli. However, there is now considerable experimental evidence 
that the amygdala has a role in a specific kind of stimulus-reward learning (Baxter and 
Murray 2002). Specifically, the amygdala does not seem to be important for classical 
Pavlovian S-S or S-R learning, or for instrumental learning. Complete removal of the 
amygdala in rats does not disrupt these types of learning. What does get disrupted with 
damage to the amygdala is the learning of current stimulus-value associations (Baxter 
and Murray 2002; Hatfield et al. 1996). Current stimulus-value associations require 
the acquisition and rapid updating of a representation of reinforcer value, and the 
linking of this to object representation. One type of stimulus-value association is 
exemplified in the so-called reinforcer-devaluation experimental paradigm. In this 
paradigm, behavioral performance depends on the capacity of the stimulus to evoke a 
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representation of the current value of the reinforcer. For instance, pairing the ingestion 
of a food reinforcer with illness (induced by injections of lithium chloride) in rats 
substantially reduces subsequent responding to a conditioned stimulus that has been 
paired with that food. This effect has been shown to be completely abolished by 
neurotoxic lesions of the basolateral amygdala (Hatfield et al. 1996). This implies that, 
following lesions to the amygdala, either the stored information about reward value 
cannot be updated, or else any successfully update information about reward value 
cannot affect response selection (Baxter and Murray 2002).  
The hippocampus is believed to be involved in the formation of episodic 
memories and in spatial navigation. Evidence about the involvement of the 
hippocampus in reward processing is insufficient. Recent studies by Rolls and Xiang 
(2005) suggest that it may be involved in forming reward-place associations. In a 
reward-place association task, neurons in the hippocampus of monkeys responded 
preferentially to the location of a more (relative to a less) preferred reward, and 
reversed the location to which they responded after the locations of the preferred and 
less preferred rewards were switched. No such patterns of activation were observed in 
visual discrimination or object-association type of tasks. Thus there is some initial 
evidence that the hippocampus may facilitate the association of places with rewards 
available. 
The mesocortical dopamine system consists of VTA dopamine projections to 
the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate. 
A region in the PFC that is often associated with reward is the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC). Neurons in more caudal OFC regions process gustatory, olfactory, and 
somatosensory reward information. For example, OFC contains the so called 
“secondary taste cortex” in which taste is represented, as well as olfactory areas in 
which information about the identity and the reward value of odors is represented 
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(Rolls 2004). Furthermore, Rolls et al. (2003) used fMRI to compare activations 
produced by pleasant, painful, and neutral touch, to the left hand of human subjects. It 
was found that OFC regions were activated more by very light pleasant touch (soft 
velvet) and by painful touch (pointed stylus) than by more physically strong but 
affectively neutral touch (wooden dowel). The affectively neutral touch activated more 
areas of the somatosensory cortex. Evidence suggests that pleasant and unpleasant 
sensory stimuli may be represented in dissociable parts of the OFC. Fore example, 
Kringelbach, and de Araujo. (2003) reported that pleasant (floral, sweet, woody) odors 
activated a medial region of the OFC and that this activation was reliably correlated 
with subjective pleasantness ratings of the odors. Unpleasant odors, on the other hand 
(hexanoic acid, octanol) activated lateral parts of the OFC. Similarly, tastes that were 
subjectively rated by participants as pleasant (sweet taste) or aversive (salt taste) 
activated areas in the OFC that were adjacent but with little overlap (O‟Doherty et al. 
2001). The question arises whether it is the pure reward value, and not the sensory 
properties of taste and odor that are represented in OFC. Studies with animals show 
that the responses of orbitofrontal taste and odor neurons, unlike responses in the 
primary taste cortex, are modulated by hunger and satiety. For example, neurons in 
OFC of monkeys responded to a particular food taste or odor when an animal was 
hungry but decreased their firing rate once the animal was satiated and the 
corresponding food was no longer rewarding (Critchley and Rolls 1996). Similarly, in 
humans, OFC activation to food (chocolate milk or tomato juice) decreased after the 
food had been eaten to satiety (Kringelbach et al. 2003). Furthermore, Rolls (2004) 
reviewed neurophysiological, imaging, and lesion evidence indicating that OFC is 
involved in Pavlovian type association learning and in the correction of associations 
when reinforcement contingencies in the environment change. In one study, OFC 
visual cells in monkeys reliably discriminated between the sight of different geometric 
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shapes (e.g., triangle vs. square) when those shapes were differentially rewarded in the 
task (Rolls et al. 1996). Importantly, when the reward associations of the stimuli were 
reversed, this resulted in a rapid behavioral learning of the new reward associations 
and in a reversal in the responses in 70% of the OFC neurons to the visual stimuli. 
This evidence suggests that OFC may also be involved in reward-related learning. 
Another structure in the mesocortical DA system that has been implicated in 
reward is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The human ACC can be divided into 
two major subdivisions: a rostral-ventral affective division (aACC) and a dorsal 
cognitive division (dACC) (Bush, Luu and Posner 2000). The affective subdivision of 
ACC is connected to several structures among which the amygdala, NAc, OFC, and 
the hippocampus, and is believed to be involved in assessing the salience of emotional 
information and the regulation of emotional processes (Bush et al. 2000). The 
cognitive subdivision of the ACC has been ascribed a number of different functions, 
including attention-for-action/target selection, motivational valence assignment, motor 
response selection, error detection/performance monitoring, competition monitoring, 
anticipation, working memory, novelty detection, and reward assessment (see Bush et 
al. 2002). The wider range of cognitive functions in which the ACC has been 
implicated suggests that a unimodal theory of its function would not be appropriate.  
Evidence from studies with both animals and humans implicates the dACC in 
reward processing. For example, Nishijo et al. (1997) reported data from single-unit 
recordings from the cingulate motor area in monkeys (CMAr, equivalent of the human 
dACC) indicating the existence of neurons that preferentially respond to rewards. For 
example, one group of neurons in the monkey CMAr responded exclusively to 
rewarding (cookie, apple) but not to aversive (syringe, brown cylinder associated with 
electric shock) or neutral (yellow cylinder with no association) stimuli, while a 
different group of CMAr neurons responded during bar pressing to obtain reward but 
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not during bar pressing to avoid shock. In humans, a study by Bush et al. (2002) found 
evidence for the existence of dACC neurons responding to reward-related stimuli. The 
study involved a reward-based decision-making task. Each trial of the study began 
with the display of an asterisk in the middle of the computer screen, and in response 
participants had to press one of two key buttons. The key presses were followed by 
one of three possible types of feedback. One feedback was “$$$$$” (CONrew) and it 
indicated that the participant had hit the correct button and would obtain 15c. 
Participants were instructed that if they got this feedback, they should continue 
pressing the same key until they received one of two other possible feedbacks: either a 
“$$$” (REDrew), indicating that they received a reduced reward of 9c. and should 
therefore switch to pressing the other button on subsequent trials to get the full reward, 
or “SWTCH”, indicating that they should press the other button to receive the full 
reward of 15c. fMRI results showed that in 7 out of 8 participants, dACC activity was 
uniformly highest on the REDrew trials. Furthermore, dACC activity was significantly 
larger on REDrew and SWITCH trials relative to CONrew trials, and even more 
importantly, dACC activity on REDrew trials was significantly larger than dACC 
activity on SWITCH trials. These results indicate that dACC neurons responded 
specifically to reward-related feedback, and not to any non-specific act of 
switching/change behavior, providing support for the hypothesis that dACC is 
involved, among other things, in reward-based decision making.  
Besides reward-based decision making, the dACC has also been implicated, as 
mentioned before, in working memory and in executive function tasks, and Ashby et 
al. (1999) have also provided extensive evidence that the dACC is involved in the 
selection of cognitive perspective – all functions assumed to be mediated by DA. If 
dACC‟s role in the reward-based decision study by Bush et al. (2002) is also mediated 
by DA, then it‟s not easy to explain why in this study dACC neurons were activated 
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following reduced reward, while DA activity generally is suppressed following the 
reduction or absence of rewards.  Thus, as pointed out by Bush et al. (2002), the story 
about ACC‟s involvement in reward processing may not be simple. Further research is 
needed to clarify the exact role of dACC in reward processing.  
 
Responses to Abstract Rewards – Evidence from fMRI Studies 
Neuroimaging studies exploring responses in humans to rewards of more 
abstract nature such as music, humor, beauty, and wealth complement our 
understanding of the function of the mesolimbic and the mesocortical dopaminergic 
systems, sometimes referred collectively as the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic 
system in reward processing and provide further evidence for the existence of reward 
circuits in the brain. 
For example, Menon and Levitin (2005) examined brain responses to classical 
music using high-resolution fMRI. Results showed that listening to pleasant music 
significantly modulated activity in parts of the mesolimbic system such as the VTA 
and the NAc, as well as the hypothalamus which is known to regulate autonomic 
responses such as heart rate and respiration. Furthermore, responses in the NAc and 
the VTA were highly correlated suggesting an association between VTA DA release 
and NAc response. Another study on the rewarding effects of music examined cerebral 
bloodflow increases and decreases as a function of music consonance/dissonance 
(Blood et al. 1999). Activations were observed in areas such as the OFC, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and subcallosal cingulate that were highly correlated with 
subjective ratings of pleasantness and were also distinct from activations in areas 
involved in perceptual processes such as the secondary auditory cortex.  
An fMRI study by Mobbs et al. (2003) demonstrated that humor also engages a 
network of subcortical structures including components of the mesolimbic 
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dopaminergic system such as the VTA and NAc, as well as the amygdala. Exposure to 
funny (vs. nonfunny) cartoons elicited reliable activation in these areas, and in 
particular in the NAc.  
Aharon et al. (2001) investigated the rewarding effects of beauty on brain 
activity in areas implicated in reward processing. Young heterosexual males viewed 
photographs of beautiful and average female faces and beautiful and average male 
faces. Three types of measures were taken: self-reported ratings of face attractiveness, 
a behavioral measure that involved pressing a key to change the relative duration of 
viewing the different images, and fMRI measures of brain activation in response to the 
viewed faces. Results from the rating and the keypress tasks revealed dissociation 
between self-reported evaluations of attractiveness and quantified measures of reward 
valuation. In particular, male subjects rated beautiful male faces as very attractive but 
did not expend effort (as measured by keypresses) to increase the viewing times of 
these faces as they did for beautiful female faces. The fMRI data showed patterns of 
activation in areas of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system such as the NAc, the VTA 
and an area of the amygdala (the sublenticular extended amygdala) that correlated 
with keypresses but not with ratings. In particular, there were positive signal changes 
in these structures for male participants viewing the beautiful female faces versus 
average female faces and relative negative signal changes for beautiful male versus 
average male faces.  
Using event-related fMRI, Knutson et al. (2001) investigated brain activation 
in response to the anticipation of increasing monetary rewards and punishments. 
While anticipation of both rewards and punishments increased activation in the medial 
caudate, only anticipation of increasing rewards was found to elicit significantly 
increased activation in the NAc that was also correlated with participants‟ self-
reported happiness. Neural responses to the anticipation and experience of monetary 
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rewards and punishments were also investigated in an fMRI study by Breiter et al. 
(2001). Participants took part in a game of chance for which they were provided with a 
monetary endowment and informed that during the game they might lose some or all 
of this money, retain it or increase it. Each experimental trial consisted of a prospect 
(or expectancy) phase, and an outcome phase which made it possible to distinguish 
brain signals of anticipation from those associated with the actual monetary outcomes. 
Analysis of the imaging data revealed that the most sustained responses to prospects 
were observed in the sublenticular extended amygdala (SLEA) and the OFC. Reliable 
responses to the good spinners were also observed in the NAc and the hypothalamus, 
while the amygdala tracked the expected values of the bad spinner. Outcome 
responses were recorded in the NAc, the SLEA, the hypothalamus and the VTA, 
suggesting little segregation of prospect and outcome responses. Importantly, 
activations in DA terminal regions such as the NAc, SLEA, and hypothalamus showed 
impressive parallels to patterns of VTA DA neuron firings in monkeys during 
anticipation and experience of food or juice rewards. The researchers concluded that 
these parallels are “consistent with the involvement of common, generalized circuitry 
in the processing of different categories of rewards” (Breiter et al. 2001, p. 627).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Evidence from a wide range of electrophysiological, lesion, pharmacological, 
and imaging studies with both humans and animals suggests that the specific brain 
regions such as the dopaminergic midbrain, striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and the amygdala play a role in representing reward. These regions 
are highly interconnected and together can be considered as an integrated network for 
representing reward. Studies have tried to tease out the exact contribution of these 
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areas to reward processing, i.e., whether the area is involved in learning about 
rewards, in amplifying the pleasant feelings associated with rewards, or in mediating 
the instrumental value of rewards. Distinctions have also been made between 
responding to rewards vs. responding to the anticipation of rewards, or reward 
prediction. As pointed out by O‟Doherty (2004), it is more likely that reward-related 
behaviors are not supported by any of these areas in isolation, but depend rather on 
interactions among them, particularly when the rewards are of a more complex 
abstract nature. Also, it is becoming clear that some of the structures involved in 
reward processing, like the ACC or the amygdala, are further composed of 
subdivisions with different functional properties, and that each of these subdivisions 
maybe involved in a different aspect of reward processing. Recent studies have also 
reported reward-related activity in other areas not associated traditionally with reward 
such as the brainstem (Pecina et al. 2006). Further work is needed to explore these 
possibilities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL LITERATURE ON 
THE EFFECTS OF POSITIVE AFFECT ON COGNITION 
 
Types of ERP Components and Their Meaning 
 
Before analyzing the ERP and fMRI literature on positive affect, it may be 
useful to briefly review some of the types of ERP components that have been observed 
when studying brain activity during affective states or in response to affective stimuli. 
One such component is the N400. It represents a negative deflection in the brain‟s 
electrical field which occurs between about 300 – 500 ms after stimulus onset, peaking 
at about 400 ms. The N400 is typically demonstrated in sentence-reading tasks in 
which the last word completing a sentence is semantically incongruent (unexpected) 
(Kutas and Hillyard 1980a). Semantically incongruent words are found to elicit larger 
N400 than semantically congruent words and the magnitude of the N400 is 
proportional to the degree of semantic deviation of a stimulus from its context (Kutas 
and Hillyard 1980a). Stimuli that are incongruent with one‟s current emotional state 
have also been found to elicit a larger N400 than emotionally congruent stimuli 
(Chung et al. 1996; Kiefer et al. 2007). Another ERP component that inexes 
unexpectedness is the P300 - a positive deflection in the brain‟s electrical field that 
peaks at about 300 ms after stimulus onset. While the N400 reflects semantic 
deviations from expectancy, the P300 indexes perceptual unexpectedness (e.g., a word 
in a font larger than the rest of the text, a high-pitch tone in a series of low-pitch 
tones). Other ERP components that have been observed when studying brain activity 
during affective states or in response to affective stimuli include a series of early 
 76 
positive and negative potentials which occur immediately after stimulus onset (100-
200 ms), as well as a series of late positive potentials (LPPs) that occur about 500 to 
700 ms after stimulus onset. The early ERPs are typically associated with early 
discrimination of and attention to a stimulus, while the LPPs are thought to reflect 
cognitive processing required for sustained attention, stimulus evaluation, or memory 
encoding (Herbert et al. 2008).  
 
Processing of Affective Stimuli 
 
Researchers have used electrophysiological measures to get an insight into 
how the brain processes various affective stimuli such as images or words. While 
these studies do not deal with affective states, they are useful because they reveal how 
the brain processes affective cues that may induce temporary affective states such as 
positive or negative moods. In fact, various affective stimuli such as pleasant pictures 
or words have been used to induce positive affect in people (Federmeier et al. 2001; 
Isen et al. 1985).  
A series of ERP studies examined changes in brain activity while participants 
viewed various positive, negative, and neutral-valence images (Cuthbert et al. 2000; 
Junghöfer 2001; Schupp et al. 2000). A common finding in all these studies is that 
emotional pictures (either positive or negative), relative to neutral pictures, induce 
increased early posterior negativity (EPN), late positive potential (LPP), and a 
sustained slow wave of positive potentials. The enhanced EPN to positive and 
negative images is interpreted to index an advantage in early perceptual encoding of 
emotional stimuli over neutral ones (Schupp et al. 2006). The increased LPP 
amplitude to emotional stimuli has been suggested to reflect their sustained 
representation in working memory, indicating a greater intrinsic significance of 
 77 
emotional over neutral stimuli (Schupp et al. 2006). The extended positive slow wave 
observed during the viewing of emotional images in some of these studies (e.g., 
Cuthbert et al. 2000) has been associated with a more elaborate processing of 
emotional relative to neutral images. Overall, researchers have concluded that the 
consistent modulation of ERP components by emotional images indexes preferential 
attending and processing of such stimuli over neutral ones, regardless of valence. 
One problem with these studies, however, is that affect is confounded with 
arousal. In all of them, the positive and negative images used are both significantly 
more arousing than the emotionally neutral images. For example, in Cuthbert et al. 
(2000) and in Schupp et al. (2000) target images were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al. 1999) and the emotional pictures were of 
highly arousing content (e.g., spiders, mutilations in the negative-valence set; sports, 
nudes in the positive-valence set). The images were presented in random order and 
participants were asked to report their reactions to each image on scales measuring 
affective valence and arousal. Physiological and ERP measures were recorded 
simultaneously. The observed pattern of enhanced amplitude of ERP components 
described earlier was correlated with participants‟ self-reported ratings of experienced 
affect and arousal and with measures of skin conductance. Thus it is not clear whether 
the observed modulation of brain activity by emotional stimuli in these studies 
indexed affective valence or arousal. In the affect literature, valence (or pleasantness) 
and arousal have been conceptualized as orthogonal components of affect (Mano 
1997; Russel 1980) and behavioral studies have shown that positive affect and 
affectless arousal have distinct effects on cognitive processes (Isen, Daubman, and 
Nowicki 1987). Only by disentangling the two would one be able to conclude that the 
observed ERP modulations reflect an attentional and processing advantage of affective 
stimuli. Furthermore, taking arousal out of the picture may reveal differences in 
 78 
response to positive and negative stimuli that may have been obscured. For example, it 
may be that positive and negative images are differentially discriminated (as would be 
indicated by differences in early ERP latencies) or elaborated (as would be indicated 
by differences in LPP amplitude). A study designed with low-arousal positive and 
negative images would make it possible to answer these questions more clearly. 
Electrophysiological measures of responses to affective cues have also been 
recorded using verbal stimuli (e.g., words). For example, Herbert et al. (2008) 
recorded ERPs while participants read pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral adjectives. At 
the end of the study, participants were given a surprise free-recall test. Memory 
performance differed as a function of word valence: pleasant adjectives were 
remembered significantly better than neutral adjectives, while recall of unpleasant and 
neutral words did not differ. 
Electrophysiological data showed that positive and negative adjectives elicited 
significantly larger-amplitude early negative potentials relative to neutral adjectives, 
indicating again an attentional advantage of emotional over neutral stimuli. Positive 
and negative adjectives (relative to neutral adjectives) elicited also larger N400 
potentials. Importantly, the N400 potential was smaller for positive relative to 
negative adjectives, indicating facilitated semantic integration of pleasant relative to 
unpleasant material, consistent with the behavioral data. Positive and negative 
adjectives also elicited significantly different late positive potentials: positive 
adjectives elicited larger LPPs compared to negative adjectives. In fact, LPPs for 
negative and neutral adjectives did not differ, but pleasant adjectives induced 
significantly larger LPPs than either neutral or unpleasant adjectives. As mentioned 
earlier, LPPs are thought to reflect cognitive processing required for sustained 
attention, stimulus evaluation, or memory encoding. Thus larger LPPs for positive 
stimuli may imply that pleasant information is selectively attended and elaborated 
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relative to unpleasant or neutral information, as has been suggested before (Isen 1984) 
and as indicated also by the better recall for pleasant words in this study.  
In sum, electrophysiological measures of responses to emotional stimuli 
suggest that such stimuli are processed preferentially over nonaffective stimuli. When 
the stimuli are highly arousing images, no difference is observed between responses to 
negative and positive emotional images. However, when the stimuli are more abstract 
(words), a facilitated processing of positive stimuli is observed, reflected in a reduced-
amplitude N400 to positive relative to negative words. Positive words are also 
elaborated more relative to negative or neutral words, as indicated by an enhanced 
LPP component. It is not quite clear why the ERP differences between positive and 
negative stimuli were observed for words but not for images, since the emotional 
words used in the Herbert et al. (2008) study were also significantly more arousing 
than the neutral words. It may be that although valence was still confounded with 
arousal in the word study, words are overall of a more abstract nature than images and 
this makes it possible to observe the difference in response to positive and negative 
stimuli. Studies with either images or words designed so that affect is not confounded 
with arousal could shed more light on these processes. 
 
ERP and fMRI Evidence for the Interplay between Affect and Cognition 
 
A series of studies using ERP and fMRI methods have been designed to shed 
light on issues related to the interplay between affect and cognition. We review here 
several studies that address questions related to the impact of affect on memory and on 
processes related to flexible thinking and creativity.  
 
 
 80 
The Influence of Affect on Memory 
 It has long been recognized that affect influences memory processes and that 
the current affective state of a person modulates the type of material retrieved from 
memory as well as judgments made about stimuli. For example, in several studies by 
Isen and colleagues (Isen and Shalker 1982; Isen et al. 1978), individuals in whom 
positive affect had been induced gave more favorable evaluations of neutral (but not 
negative) items relative to individuals in a neutral affect condition. It was suggested 
that positive affect has these effects because it serves as a cue that makes positive 
material more accessible from memory (Isen et al. 1978).  
Proponents of the “affect-as-information” hypothesis (Schwarz 1990; Schwarz 
and Clore 1983), on the other hand, have argued that the effects of positive affect on 
memory and judgments are the result of a different type of mechanism. They have 
suggested that when making evaluations, people ask themselves how they feel about 
the object of judgment. The experience of positive affect is interpreted to mean that 
the object is valuable, which leads to a positive judgment, and the experience of 
negative affect is interpreted to mean that the object of judgment lacks value, leading 
to a more negative judgment. It has also been suggested that negative affect signals the 
existence of problems that need to be solved and motivates careful systematic 
processing, whereas positive affect signals that the environment is benign and 
encourages sloppier, less careful processing as there is no need to exert cognitive 
effort (Schwarz and Clore 1983). 
A significant amount of behavioral data has accumulated that is inconsistent 
with this position. For example, a series of studies by Isen and colleagues on decision 
making have shown that positive affect promotes the use of more efficient decision-
making strategies without leading to the use of heuristics or to sloppier thinking 
(Estrada, Isen, and Young 1997; Isen, Rosenzweig, and Young 1991). Also, studies 
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have shown that people in positive affect (relative to those in neutral affect) are more 
likely to attend to and elaborate on negative information when it is important and self-
relevant (Reed and Aspinwall 1998; Trope and Pomerantz 1998). Furthermore, 
evidence that positive affect leads to less careful processing is usually indirect (see, 
e.g., Isen 2000, for discussion). In persuasion studies, for example, positive affect 
participants have been shown to change their attitude following either weak- or strong-
attitude messages, while neutral- or negative-mood participants are persuaded only by 
the strong-argument message. However, as pointed out earlier (e.g., Isen 2000), when 
explicitly asked, positive affect participants do distinguish between strong and weak 
arguments, and they also don‟t differ from controls in memory for the content of the 
message (Bless et al. 1990; Mackie and Worth 1989). Finally, Bless et al. (1996) 
showed that although participants in positive affect made more intrusion errors in a 
recognition task, implying greater reliance on general knowledge structures, they also 
performed significantly better than negative-mood participants on a secondary 
cognitive task, providing evidence against the hypothesis that positive mood leads to 
cognitive or motivational impairment.  
In spite of all this evidence, the position that positive affect leads to less 
systematic processing and to reliance on heuristics has been slow to loose ground. For 
example, only recently Clore and Huntsinger (2007) reviewed literature in support of 
the idea that positive affect leads to more stereotyping, false memories, and use of 
heuristics, and that it influences memory and judgments directly by serving as 
“experiential and bodily information regarding how one feels about the object of 
judgment” (Clore and Huntsinger 2007, p. 393). It is insightful, therefore, to look at 
electrophysiological and imaging data that might shed light into the mechanisms 
through which positive affect influences memory and judgments. 
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The influence of affect on mechanisms of retrieval. Chung et al. (1996) 
investigated how mood states influence the semantic material activated from memory.  
This was done by recording ERP responses to good or bad outcomes of various life 
stories that were congruent or incongruent with participants‟ experimentally induced 
affective state. Affect was induced by informing participants that they would be in 
charge of their own mood state and that they had been randomly assigned to either a 
“pessimistic” or an “optimistic” mood condition and should maintain this mood by 
thinking about happy or sad events in their life. Subsequently, participants read brief 
stories of life events. They had to press a key to read the last word of the story which 
represented the story outcome and was either good (happy outcome), bad (sad 
outcome), or semantically incongruent. 
Semantically incongruent outcomes elicited the largest N400 potentials. This is 
consistent with previous findings (Kutas and Hillyard 1980 a, b) indicating that N400 
amplitude indexes semantic deviations from expectations. Importantly, mood-
incongruent outcome words were also associated with an N400 that was reliably larger 
than the N400 for mood-congruent words, although smaller than the N400 for 
semantically incongruent words. Specifically, bad outcomes elicited larger N400 than 
good outcomes for participants in the optimistic-mood condition and conversely, good 
outcomes elicited a larger N400 than bad outcomes in participants in the pessimistic 
mood condition. Thus, just as material that was semantically incongruent with its 
context elicited large N400, so did material that was incongruent with mood in terms 
of affective valence. This implies that different mood states activated different types of 
material from memory, which is consistent with Isen et al.‟s (1978) suggestion that 
positive mood brings to mind positive material from memory.  
Chung et al. (1996), however, found symmetric effects for pessimistic and 
optimistic moods: pessimistic mood made negative outcomes more accessible as 
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reflected in the smaller N400 for negative outcomes relative to positive outcomes.  
Results for the effect of negative mood on memory have been mixed. While findings 
from studies with depressed individuals suggest that negative mood produces biases in 
favor of negative material in memory (see Chung et al. 1996 for a review), in a study 
by Isen et al. (1978) negative mood did not enhance memory for previously learned 
negative words relative to neutral words (Isen et al. 1978). The results from Chung et 
al. (1996) should be interpreted with caution. First, they did not directly test memory; 
although the ERP data suggests that the different mood states activated different type 
of semantic material from memory, we do not know if mood also influenced recall. 
Second, the mood manipulation technique used in the study was rather heavy-handed. 
Participants were explicitly told that they had to maintain a particular mood during the 
study and that they were to expect an outcome to each of the life stories that was either 
emotionally good or bad. It is possible that this manipulation created a demand effect 
and participants were aware that if they were in an optimistic state they should expect 
a good outcome, and if they were in a pessimistic state they should expect a bad 
outcome. A replication of the Chung et al. (1996) study with a proper affect induction 
would help clarify the effects of positive and negative affect on access to material in 
memory.  
Recently, Kiefer et al. (2007) conducted a study with a more subtle 
manipulation of affect that examined the influence of affect on the type of semantic 
material retrieved from memory and on memory at encoding. The focus of the study 
was on ERP patterns observed while participants in either positive or negative affect 
learned lists of emotional words. The dependent measures of interest were ERP 
deflections during encoding of the words, as well as behavioral measures such as 
recall performance, as a function of mood and word valence. Half of the words 
participants had to learn were fragmented (had 1 to 3 letters missing). This was done 
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to explore the effect of affect on memory when information is actively manipulated 
during encoding (by generating the word from the word fragment). The researchers 
hypothesized that mood states would activate mood-congruent material in memory 
providing a semantic context for the words to be encoded. Words of valence congruent 
with the induced mood were expected to elicit smaller N400 amplitude than 
incongruent words, since N400 is typically smaller when the semantic material is 
already activated by a preceding semantic context (Kutas and Hillyard 1980a, b). 
Affect in this study was induced by having participants view a series of short video 
clips (with either funny or sad content) prior to learning the word lists. Words were 
positive or negative trait adjectives that were equated on frequency and length and 
were also of very low arousal (.30 to .99, on a scale of 1 to 5). During the learning 
task, words appeared on a computer screen one by one, each followed by a blank 
screen, and then a question mark at which point participants were asked to say aloud 
the word they had just seen. At the end of each word series, participants performed a 
free-recall task and reported the strategy they had used during learning. 
ERP data revealed a main effect of word valence: positive words elicited 
smaller N400 than negative words. More importantly, this main effect of stimulus 
valence was modulated by participants‟ affective state. Positive words elicited a 
significantly smaller N400 than negative words only in participants in positive affect; 
for participants in negative affect the effect of word valence was absent - there was no 
significant difference in N400 amplitude for positive vs. negative words. These results 
imply that positive mood may have activated stored positive semantic material in 
memory and as a result, mood-congruent (positive) words were primed and were more 
efficiently encoded into existing knowledge structures. This replicates the effect of 
positive mood obtained by Chung et al. (1996) and provides indirect evidence against 
the “affect-as-information” position that positive affect influences judgments directly 
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through a heuristic inference from the current mood (“how do I feel about it?”), rather 
than through integration of the incoming information into activated semantic 
structures. Unlike Chung et al. (1996), however, Kiefer et al. (2007) did not observe a 
reciprocal effect for negative affect. While positive affect facilitated the encoding of 
positive emotional words, negative affect did not conversely facilitate the encoding of 
negative words. It is possible that this asymmetry was not observed in Chung et al. 
(1996) due to the heavy-handed nature of their affect induction, while Kiefer et al. 
(2007) used a more subtle affect induction.  
Further support for the asymmetry between the effects of positive and negative 
affect came from source analysis of the ERP data. This analysis revealed that negative 
affect was associated with activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, an area 
associated with working memory processes during rote rehearsal, and the right inferior 
prefrontal cortex, an area associated with negative emotions (Kiefer et al. 2007). 
Positive affect, on the other hand, was associated with activity in the left inferior 
prefrontal cortex and also with activity close to the frontal midline. The left inferior 
prefrontal cortex is a region that has been involved in verbal information processing 
during episodic memory. Activity close to the frontal midline is attributed to 
activation of the dorsal parts of the anterior cingulate cortex – an area that has been 
implicated in executive control processes and in the flexible updating of cognitive 
representations (Bush, Luu, and Posner 2001; Ashby, Isen, and Turken 1999). These 
results are in line with the dopaminergic hypothesis of positive affect (Ashby et al. 
1999) which holds that the effects of positive affect on cognition are mediated by 
increased release of the neurotransmitter dopamine in areas such as the prefrontal 
cortex and the anterior cingulate. They also provide evidence against the position that 
positive affect leads to a heuristic non-systematic cognitive style while negative affect 
promotes a more analytical and careful processing (Mackie and Worth 1989; Schwarz 
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and Bless 1991). The behavioral data in the study further strengthens these findings. 
Specifically, recall rate was highest for positive generated words in participants in 
positive mood. Also, participants in positive mood reported most frequently using 
elaborative strategies when learning the words (i.e., forming a story out of the word, 
relating it to a familiar person), characteristic of deeper semantic encoding. 
Participants in negative affect, on the other hand, reported using non-elaborative 
strategies such as rote rehearsal most frequently. 
In sum, the electrophysiological data reported by Chung et al. (1996) and 
Kiefer et al. (2007) provide insights into several important issues related to positive 
affect (see Isen, 1984, 2000 for discussion of the issues). First, they provide evidence 
at the neurological level that positive affect makes positive material more accessible in 
memory. Second, they reveal an asymmetry between the effects of positive and 
negative affect on cognitive processes. Third, they provide support for the position 
that positive affect does not lead to non-systematic careless processing but rather 
promotes an elaborative cognitive style, that is at least in part mediated by activity in 
dopamine-rich areas such as the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate.  
Neither Chung et al. (1996), nor Kiefer et al. (2007) included a control neutral-
affect condition in their studies. Adding such a condition is important, because the 
study by Herbert et al. (2008) reviewed earlier revealed smaller N400 for positive 
relative to negative adjectives even in participants in neutral mood. Thus one may 
argue that people normally process pleasant positive-valence information more easily 
than negative information and that the attenuation of N400 amplitude for positive 
stimuli observed by Chung and Kiefer may just as likely be observed in neutral-affect 
condition. Including a neutral-affect condition and comparing the amplitude of the 
N400 in that condition to the N400 in the positive-affect condition would make it 
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possible to conclude with more certainty that positive affect cues positive material and 
facilitates its semantic integration in memory.  
The influence of affect on mechanisms of encoding. The pattern of results 
observed by Kiefer et al. (2007) suggests that the influence of positive affect on 
memory can be accounted for not only by mechanisms at time of retrieval, but also by 
mechanisms at time of encoding. Evidence in this regard from behavioral studies has 
been mixed. While in some studies participants who learned a list of brand names 
while being in a positive affective state subsequently recalled more brand names than 
participants who learned the names in a neutral affective state (Lee and Sternthal 
1999), other researchers have found that positive affect impacts memory at time of 
retrieval but not at time of encoding (Isen et al. 1978). Several studies employing 
fMRI imaging techniques explore these questions (Erk et al. 2003; Lewis et al. 2005; 
and Maratos et al. 2001).  
Erk et al. (2003) studied the influence of affective context on the encoding of 
emotionally neutral material. They used fMRI to record brain activity at encoding and 
correlate it with recall performance. The hypothesis was that differences in recall 
would be associated with different patterns of brain activation during encoding, as a 
function of affective state during encoding. Affect in this study was manipulated by 
having participants view positive, negative, or neutral pictures from the IAP system 
(Lang 1999). Pictures of a certain valence were grouped in blocks of seven. After the 
presentation of each picture, a word was shown that had to be classified as abstract or 
concrete. At the end of each session, participants were asked to recall the words they 
had seen. Behavioral results indicated that words presented in a block of positive 
pictures were recalled significantly better than words presented in a block of neutral or 
negative pictures. Thus positive affect at encoding improved subsequent recall. This is 
in line with Kiefer et al. (2007) who also found a facilitating effect of positive affect 
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during encoding on recall performance, and in general with the view expressed by 
Ashby et al. (1999) of positive affect facilitating a more deep semantic processing of 
information. The inclusion of a benchmark neutral-affect condition complements 
nicely Kiefer et al.‟s results, indicating a clear encoding advantage under positive 
affect. Analysis of the fMRI data revealed an overall correlation between recall 
success and activity at encoding in the left inferior frontal cortex - the same region that 
was activated when participants in the Kiefer et al. (2007) study encoded words in the 
positive affect “generate” condition. Researchers have suggested that this region is 
involved in verbal information processing during episodic memory (Fletcher, Shallice, 
and Dolan 1998). The relation between recall success and brain activity at encoding, 
however, was modulated by affect at encoding. Specifically, recall success was 
associated with activity in the anterior and posterior parahippocampal gyrus and the 
extrastriate visual areas during encoding in positive affect. When participants 
experienced negative affect at encoding, recall success was predicted by encoding 
activation in the amygdala region. These results imply that positive and negative affect 
activated different brain regions and had their effect on memory through distinct 
neural mechanisms.  
While Erk et al. (2003) and Kiefer et al. (2007) explored the effect of affect on 
memory by exploring the relationship between brain activation during encoding and 
subsequent recall, Maratos et al. (2001) examined brain activation at time of retrieval. 
The material to be encoded in their study were neutral words which were presented in 
the context of 45 separate sentences: 15 negative, 15 positive, and 15 neutral 
sentences, mixed randomly. The target neutral word in each of the sentences was 
presented alone after the sentence, and participants were asked to remember it in the 
context of the preceding sentence. At the end of the study session participants 
performed a recognition memory test in which the target words from the study 
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sentences were presented along with 15 new words. Participants were asked to judge 
whether or not they had seen each of the words in the study phase. Patterns of brain 
activation were recorded during the recognition task. Behavioral data did not reveal 
any differences in recognition as a function of the valence of word context. The lack 
of difference in memory performance for positive and negative material may be due to 
the nature of the memory test used - recognition instead of recall. fMRI results showed 
that retrieval of items encoded in emotional (relative to neutral) contexts was 
associated with activation mainly in the prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus. 
Relative to items from neutral contexts, items from positive contexts elicited enhanced 
activity mainly in the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex which is consistent with evidence 
that this region is involved in the processing of rewards and reward-predicting stimuli 
(Rolls 2004; Rolls et al. 2003). Items from the negative contexts elicited activity 
mainly in the left amygdala. Based on these patterns, Maratos et al. (2001) concluded 
that re-exposure to previously learned material activated memory for the affective 
context in which this material was first encoded, implying that the same regions that 
are activated when emotional information is encoded are also active when emotional 
information is retrieved from memory. This suggests that semantic material is 
encoded, among other things, according to its affective valence. This would also imply 
that a subsequent affective state that is congruent with the valence of the encoded 
information should facilitate retrieval of this information. 
This prediction was tested by Lewis et al. (2005). They examined brain 
activity, using fMRI, during both encoding and retrieval phases of a mood-congruent 
memory task. It was predicted that mood at retrieval would reactivate emotional 
responses linked to the valenced information at encoding. Thus, increased activation in 
emotion-related areas of the brain during both encoding and retrieval would be 
associated with facilitative effects of mood congruence on memory. Participants in the 
 90 
study were first presented with positive and negative words, in mixed order, and asked 
to indicate whether these words could be used to describe themselves in any abstract 
sense. Then participants underwent a mood induction procedure involving happy or 
sad pieces of music played for 3.15 min. accompanied by the presentation of a series 
of standardized faces with matching emotion (happy or sad). Finally, participants 
performed a memory test in which they saw a series of words and were asked to 
indicate which of these words they had seen at study. Brain activity was recorded 
using fMRI during both the study and the recognition phases of the experiment. The 
behavioral data showed a significant main effect of word valence: positive words were 
better remembered than negative words. There was also a trend toward a main effect 
of word congruence, and a significant interaction between the two. Specifically, there 
was a significant influence of congruence on memory for negatively valenced words, 
but not for positively valenced words. Imaging results revealed two brain areas where 
activity at encoding predicted subsequent mood congruent retrieval and which were 
also active in response to congruent mood at retrieval. These two areas were the 
subgenual cingulate for positive valence and the posterior-lateral orbitofrontal cortex 
for negative valence. The subgenual cingulate has been shown to respond to various 
stimuli among which are rewards, while the posterior-lateral orbitofrontal cortex has 
been implicated in punishment (Lewis et al. 2005). Activity in these two areas during 
encoding predicted subsequent memory in congruent (vs. incongruent) moods, and 
they also exhibited greater activation during congruent (vs. incongruent) recall. 
The results of the Lewis et al. study imply that semantic material is encoded, 
among other aspects, according to its valence and that a congruent mood at retrieval 
facilitates recollection of this material. Isen et al. (1978) had previously suggested that 
material to be learned is encoded according to its semantic meaning (including its 
valence) and that material of positive semantic meaning is more readily accessed later 
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in a congruent positive mood. Lewis et al., however, propose that mood-congruence 
effects can be due to any factor influencing encoding: not just the semantic meaning of 
the material, but also mood, arousal, etc. This proposition is consistent with the state-
dependent learning paradigm, whereby memory is facilitated when mood at retrieval 
matches mood at encoding. The behavioral data by Isen et al. (1978) speak against 
state-dependent learning. In their studies, performance at retrieval was not influenced 
by mood at encoding, but only by mood at retrieval, and the congruence between 
affective state during the two stages (encoding and retrieval) did not impact memory. 
To test the validity of the proposition by Lewis et al., (2001) using imaging data, a 
study would have to be designed in which affect is manipulated both at encoding and 
at retrieval, and brain activity is also recorded at both points in time. Evidence in 
support of state-dependent learning would be obtained if, behaviorally, recall is 
facilitated when mood at encoding matches mood at retrieval. At the neurological 
level we would expect to see enhanced activation of brain areas implicated in positive 
or negative affect during both encoding and retrieval. 
 
The Influence of Affect on Cognitive Flexibility and Creativity 
Behavioral studies have shown that positive affect promotes cognitive 
flexibility. Specifically, people in positive affect, relative to those in neutral affect, 
have been shown to give more diverse and less typical associations to neutral words 
(Green and Noice 1988; Isen et al. 1985) and to categorize neutral material more 
flexibly and see more ways in which nontypical members of categories can fit or be 
viewed as members of these categories (Isen and Daumban 1984; Isen, Niedenthal and 
Cantor 1992; Kahn and Isen 1993). The enhanced cognitive flexibility under positive 
affect has also been shown to lead to increased creativity and problem solving abilities 
(Estrada, Isen, and Young 1997; Isen, Daumbman and Nowicki 1987; Isen and Means 
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1983). Isen and colleagues have suggested that positive affect has these effects 
because it cues access to positive material in memory (Isen et al. 1978) and positive 
material in memory is richer than neutral material (Boucher & Osgood 1969; Isen et 
al. 1985). Therefore, positive affect creates a richer cognitive context which allows 
people to think of more and more unique aspects of things and to see more 
relationships and associations between them. This leads to a more flexible 
categorization of items, whereby individuals in positive mood, compared to those in 
neutral mood, are more likely to classify fringe exemplars of a category as members of 
that category and in general to find more relationships and associations between 
distantly related items (e.g., Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Isen and Daubman 
1984; Isen, Niedenthal & Cantor 1992; Kahn and Isen 1993). Studies by Federmeier et 
al. (2201) and Subramaniam et al. (2008) explore the neurological mechanisms behind 
these effects.  
Federmeier et al. (2001) used ERP methodology to examine the influence of 
positive affect on accessibility of material in memory and on cognitive organization. 
In this study, positive affect was induced by having participants view a series of 
“happy” photographs (e.g., cute animals, smiling people), while controls viewed 
photographs of neutral objects (e.g., household objects, etc.). All photographs were 
selected from the IAPS (Lang et al. 1999) and positive and neutral photographs did 
not differ in terms of arousal. In the main task, participants viewed pairs of sentences 
on a computer screen; the first sentence established the context for the follow-up target 
sentence. The target sentence was presented word by word and the last word differed 
in the extent of its expectancy or congruence with the preceding material. For 
example, the context sentence „They wanted to make the hotel look more like a 
tropical resort‟ was followed by the target sentence „So, along the driveway they 
planted rows of…‟ which ended either with “palm trees” (expected), “pine tress” 
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(unexpected but from the expected semantic category), or “tulips” (unexpected and 
from a different, thought related semantic category). ERP results indicated that both 
controls and positive-affect participants exhibited comparable large N400 amplitude 
following the unexpected word from the same category (pine trees) relative to the 
expected word (palm trees), indicating that the unexpected word was harder to 
integrate semantically than the expected word. However, controls exhibited an even 
larger N400 following the incongruous exemplar from the different category (tulips), 
while for participants in positive affect the N400 amplitude following the unexpected 
but related category exemplar (tulips) was not larger than that following the 
unexpected same-category exemplar (pine trees). These results were interpreted to 
imply that positive mood, relative to neutral mood, facilitated the integration of 
exemplars from distantly related categories.  
However, one may argue that the attenuated N400 amplitude in the positive 
affect condition indicates less careful processing of the material, rather than 
facilitation of the semantic integration of distantly related items. It may be that 
participants in positive affect did not perceive differences between unexpected target 
and non-target items because they processed the information more superficially and 
registered only the obvious discrepancy (between the expected and unexpected items) 
but did not appreciate the difference between unexpected items that came from 
different categories. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the position, 
described earlier, that positive affect leads to increased use of heuristics and to less 
careful and systematic processing of information due to reduced cognitive or 
motivational capacity (e.g., Bless et al. 1990; Mackie and Worth 1989; Schwartz and 
Clore 1983). A modified version of the Federmeier et al. (2001) study can be designed 
to rule out such an interpretation. Specifically, in addition to the three types of 
sentence endings used in the original study, a fourth type of sentence ending could be 
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added – unexpected and from a category completely unrelated to the target one. If 
positive affect leads to less careful processing, then under positive affect the amplitude 
of the N400 component in response to the unexpected and unrelated-category item 
would not differ from the N400 to the other two unexpected items. However, if 
positive affect helps people to see associations between more distantly related items, 
but not between completely unrelated items, then under positive mood N400 to 
unexpected unrelated items would be larger than N400 to unexpected but plausibly 
related items. Furthermore, including a negative-mood condition would also allow us 
to compare the effect of positive and negative affect on semantic organization and 
memory retrieval processes.  
A recent fMRI study by Subramaniam et al. (2008) also explores the 
neurological mechanisms through which positive affect promotes cognitive flexibility. 
The study examines the relationship between affect and problem solving strategy 
(insight vs. analytical) on the one hand, and affect and brain activity immediately prior 
and during problem solving, on the other hand. Participants in this study were given a 
set of Remote Associates problems which could be solved applying either a creative 
“insight” strategy, or a more methodical and analytic strategy without insight. Affect 
was not experimentally induced, but was measured at the beginning of the session 
through self-reports on the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS) and state 
anxiety scale (STAI). For each problem, participants indicated the type of solution 
strategy they had used. Brain activity was recorded, using fMRI, prior to as well as 
during problem solving.  
Behavioral results showed that participants higher in positive affect solved 
significantly more problems, and in particular solved more problems using an insight 
strategy, relative to participants lower in positive affect. Positive affect did not 
influence the number of problems solved analytically.  
 95 
fMRI data indicated that the creative problem solving advantage under positive 
mood was mediated by activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Specifically, 
preparatory activity (activity immediately before problem presentation) in the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex correlated with positive affect and with dorsal anterior 
cingulate activity during “insight” problem solving. This is in line with Ashby et al.‟s 
(1999) dopaminergic account for the effect of positive affect on creativity and 
cognitive flexibility in general. In particular, Ashby et al. (1999) have suggested that 
positive affect‟s beneficial influence on cognitive flexibility is at least in part mediated 
by enhanced release of the neurotransmitter dopamine in brain areas including the 
anterior cingulate cortex. The anterior cingulate is involved in executive control 
processes, and in particular in the selection of cognitive perspective. It has been 
hypothesized that increased dopamine levels in the anterior cingulate enhance 
cognitive flexibility by facilitating the selection of more unusual responses over 
prepotent, more dominant responses. This is precisely the type of mechanism involved 
in “insight” problem solving where the right solution is reached by perceiving 
relationships and associations between more distant and not obviously related 
concepts.  
The study by Subramaniam et al. (2008) is important because it provides direct 
neurological evidence in support of Ashby et al.‟s (1999) dopaminergic hypothesis of 
positive affect. Importantly, participants high in positive affect did not solve fewer 
problems using analytical strategies relative to those low in positive affect, but they 
also solved significantly more problems through a more creative insight process. This 
implies that the creative problem solving advantage observed under positive affect did 
not come at the cost of more systematic analytical problem solving. Furthermore, 
anxiety had the opposite effect: participants higher in anxiety solved as many 
problems using analytical strategy as people lower in anxiety, but they solved 
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significantly fewer problems with insight. Thus neither positive mood nor anxiety 
influenced analytical problem solving, but they had significant and opposite effects on 
creative problem solving.  
 
Summary and Implications 
 
The ERP and imaging studies reviewed in this paper provide insight into a 
number of areas related to the effect of positive affect on cognitive processes. First, 
Chung et al. (1996) and Kiefer et al. (2007) show that positive affect facilitates the 
processing of positive-valence stimuli, as indicated by a smaller N400 component for 
positive material under positive affect. This is consistent with behavioral data 
suggesting that positive affect makes positive material more accessible from memory 
(Isen et al. 1978). Federmeier et al. (2001) further provide evidence that positive 
affect, relative to neutral affect, activates more diverse semantic material from 
memory and creates a richer cognitive context that allows people to perceive 
associations and relationships between more distantly related items. This is indicated 
by a smaller N400 ERP component in response to exemplars of distant but plausibly 
related semantic categories observed in conditions of positive (relative to neutral) 
affect. These findings are in line with behavioral data suggesting that positive affect 
helps people think of more unique and diverse associations to words and facilitates a 
more flexible categorization of semantic material (e.g., Isen and Daubman 1984; Isen 
et al. 1985). Neurological evidence for the effect of positive affect on cognitive 
flexibility comes also from the study by Subramaniam et al. (2008) who demonstrate 
that people high in positive affect are just as good as those low in positive affect at 
solving problems through analytic strategy, and are significantly better at solving 
problems through creative “insight” strategy.  It is also shown that these effects are 
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associated with activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, an area that has been 
implicated in cognitive control processes.  
The studies also reveal that the effects of positive affect on memory are not 
limited only to processes at retrieval. In Kiefer et al. (2007) participants exhibited 
superior recall and reported using learning strategies indicative of more elaborate deep 
processing when they had encoded material under positive (vs. negative) affect. This 
superiority of positive affect was correlated with activity (during encoding) in the left 
inferior prefrontal cortex and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, indicating again the 
presence of more complex processing under positive affect. 
Overall, the ERP and fMRI data from the examined studies is in line with a 
growing number of behavioral studies showing that positive affect promotes flexible 
and creative thinking, without leading to less careful processing or to increased use of 
heuristics (e.g., Ashby et al. 1999; Bauman and Kuhl 2005; Estrada et al. 1997; 
Fredrickson and Branigan 2005; Isen et al. 1987; Reed and Aspinwall 1998). The 
papers also provide evidence that the effects of positive and negative affect on 
cognition are not symmetrical: while positive affect cues positive material from 
memory, negative affect does not cue negative material from memory and does not 
facilitate the integration of such material, at least not in healthy subjects (Isen 1984, 
1990; Isen et al. 1978; Kiefer et al. 2007). It is possible that the tendency for people in 
negative affect to skew thinking towards negative content in memory reported 
elsewhere (see Chung et al. 1996 for a review) is limited to patients suffering from 
depression. Future ERP studies with such groups of participants could test for this 
possibility. The reviewed studies also show that negative affect does not improve 
analytical and systematic thinking (Subramaniam et al. 2008) and that it leads to the 
use of more shallow learning strategies such as rote rehearsal (Kiefer et al. 2007). 
These results are in sharp contrast to the position held by proponents of the affect-as-
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information model (Schwarz and Bless 1991; Schwarz and Clore 1983) who argue that 
negative mood promotes careful systematic thinking (e.g., Clore and Huntsinger 2007; 
Gasper and Clore 2002; Storbeck and Clore 2005). Finally, studies using fMRI 
technology demonstrate that positive and negative affect are associated with activity in 
different brain areas: negative affect is consistently associated with activation of the 
amygdala, while cognitive effects under positive affect are associated with activity in 
various areas among which the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the left inferior 
prefrontal cortex.  
Some areas remain to be clarified. First, most of the studies reviewed did not 
include a control neutral-affect condition. As explained earlier, this poses a problem as 
conclusions are drawn based on comparison of effects under positive affect with those 
under negative affect and it is not clear whether observed differences are due to the 
effect of positive (relative to neutral) affect, the effect of negative (relative to neutral) 
affect, or both. Also, positive affect is sometimes confounded with arousal, which also 
makes drawing conclusions about the causality of the observed effects difficult.   
In terms of theoretical implications, several questions come to mind. For 
example, in Isen et al. (1978), affect at time of encoding did not affect the material to 
be learned. Erk et al. (2003) and Kiefer et al. (2007), on the other hand, showed 
superior recall for words learned in positive affect. It may be that Isen et al. (1978) did 
not observe a memory effect of affect during encoding because affect was manipulated 
both at encoding and at retrieval.  
Another question that remains to be clarified relates to state-dependent 
learning. Although none of the studies reviewed here tested directly for state-
dependent effects, Lewis et al. (2005) suggested that just as congruence between 
valence of encoded material and affect at time of retrieval improved memory, so 
would congruence between affect at time of encoding and affect at time of retrieval. A 
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study that manipulates affect at both points in time, and also records brain activity at 
both points in time could test this prediction.  
Finally, an issue that needs clarification concerns the brain areas that were 
found to be involved in mood-congruency memory effects. Erk et al. (2003), on the 
one hand, reported that memory performance was correlated with encoding activity 
(under positive mood) in the anterior and posterior parahippocampal gyrus and the 
extrastriate visual areas. Lewis et al. (2005), on the other hand, found that memory 
performance was predicted by encoding activity (under positive mood) in the 
subgenual cingulate. The difference may be due in part to differences in the nature of 
the stimuli to be encoded: neutral words in the Erk study, and positive and negative 
words in the Lewis study.  
In closing, the studies reviewed in this paper provide support at the 
neurological level for the beneficial effects of positive affect on thinking and behavior 
demonstrated previously (see Ashby et al. 1999; Isen 2000, 2008 for reviews). Future 
ERP and fMRI studies could further enhance our understanding of the specific 
mechanisms that underlie the wide range of cognitive and behavioral effects of 
positive affect.  
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